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I. INTRODUCTION
OR centuries scholars have debated why the legal system enforces
contracts, with no consensus having been reached.1 This failure of
consensus suggests that judges likewise disagree as to why con-
1. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CoNTRAcrs 6-7 (6th ed.
2009) ("For centuries, philosophers of the law have attempted to explain why, in addition
to the keeping of the public peace, the legal system recognizes and enforces private agree-
ments. As is so frequently the case in philosophical discourse no consensus has been
reached...."); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269,
270 (1986) [hereinafter Barnett, Consent Theory] (recognizing "the current lack of a con-
sensus concerning the proper basis of contractual obligation .... ); DORI KIMEL, FROM
PROMISE TO CoNTRAcr: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF CoNTRAcr 1 (2003) (noting
that whether contracts are promises has occupied "generations of thinkers, all failing to
come up with a conclusive answer .... "); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in
THE THEORY OF CoNTRAcr LAW 206, 242 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) ("There has been a
basic tension in contract theory between those who argue that promise is almost everything
and those who argue that promise is almost nothing.").
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tracts are (or should be) legally enforced. 2 If the American legal realists
were correct-that legal doctrine is generally indeterminate and that
judges use doctrine to simply justify a decision based on what the judge
thinks is "right" or "fair" 3-this disagreement would be manifested in
differing outcomes in contract cases with similar facts. Interestingly, this
legal realist notion seems to be supported by how trial courts treat a par-
ticular type of contract dispute: the alleged breach of an employee cove-
nant not to compete. 4
Practitioners report that it is very difficult to predict how a trial court
will respond to an employee non-compete case. 5 One commentator has
stated that "the courts have frequently vacillated on [non-compete] provi-
sions-even when the employees' agreements and positions were essen-
tially the same, and even at the same company."' 6 Another has stated that
"different judges can look at the same set of facts and reach completely
different conclusions."'7 Another has stated that "the outcome of an
emergency motion to enforce a non-compete agreement can be all but
2. See ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND
CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 191-92 (1997) (suggesting,
while discussing Critical Legal Studies, that individual judges will have different concep-
tions as to why contracts should be enforced).
3. Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
AND LEGAL THEORY 257 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010). This legal realist theme was
echoed by critical legal studies scholars. See HILLMAN, supra note 2, at 191-92 ("CLS has
taken up and expanded the themes of the legal realists. Although some CLS theorists
concede the potential of contract doctrine to confine some decisions, they assert that the
legal system falls far short of 'strict rule-bound legalism.' Instead, formal contract rules are
largely 'indeterminate' because they rarely dictate a particular result in an important case.
It is not that the results of litigation are necessarily unpredictable,... but that contract
doctrine offers the potential for deciding cases in multiple ways.").
4. This Article does not take a position on whether the legal realists and critical legal
studies scholars are correct in general about the indeterminacy of contract doctrine, or
whether such indeterminacy results in judges using doctrine to simply support the decision
they believe is fair. This Article's thesis is limited to employee covenants not to compete.
In this latter setting, the applicable law is, in fact, highly indeterminate and the opportunity
to justify a result by the manipulation of legal doctrine is substantial.
5. See Stephen M. Kramarsky, IBM's Hard Lesson in Non-Competes, N.Y. L.J., Mar.
22, 2011, at 5 (observing that "results can be very difficult to predict"); Jonathan Cooper,
Why It's Often Hard to Predict if a NY Court Will Enforce a Non-Compete Agreement, NY
SMALL BUSINESS BLOG (Apr. 1, 2011), http://nysmallbusinessattorney.com/why-its-so-
hard-to-predict-if-a-ny-court-wil-enforce-a-non-compete-agreement/ (stating that "it is
very difficult to predict accurately whether a New York court will enforce a non-compete
agreement ...."); Robert Wood, Non-compete Agreements Texas Attorney: What Consti-
tutes Confidential Information in Texas?, TEXAS NON-COMPETE LAW BLOG: TEXAS NON-
COMPETE AND TRADE SECRETS LAW (Apr. 16, 2010, 6:18 PM), http://www.texasnon-com-
petelaw.com/2010/04/articles/non-compete-agreements/non-compete-agreements-texas-at-
torney-what-constitutes-confidential-information-in-texas ("[lit is difficult to predict with
certainty how a particular dispute involving a non-compete agreement will be decided in
court."); Phillip Kilgore & Jeff Dunlaevy, Battle-Worthy Non-Competes: Lessons From the
Wreckage of Recent Cases, 19 S.C. LAW. 24, 26 (2008) ("Enforcement of non-compete
agreements in South Carolina's courts ... continues to be a frustrating and unpredictable
venture."); N. James Turner, Successfully Defending Employees in Non-compete and Trade
Secret Litigation, 78 FLA. B.J. 43, 43 (2004) (noting that non-compete cases are often
unpredictable).
6. Cooper, supra note 5 (emphasis omitted).
7. Wood, supra note 5.
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impossible to predict... [and] past performance is no guarantee of future
results."'8 Legal scholars agree,9 one stating that "[d]espite the net-
tlesome policy issues that plague non-compete law, there is one thing eve-
ryone can agree on-the current law is in a state of near chaos. Years
upon years of seemingly inconsistent enforcement decisions have pro-
vided little concrete guidance as to what constitutes an enforceable agree-
ment." 10 This unpredictability has not abated and was recently illustrated
by International Business Machines Corporation v. Visentin," in which a
federal district court reached a different result from a previous decision-
International Business Machines Corporation v. Papermasterl2-by the
same court just over two years earlier on arguably similar facts. This un-
predictability might explain why the alleged breach of employee non-
competition agreements is frequently litigated.' 3
Such unpredictability is likely caused by several factors. First, many
judges are probably more hostile to such agreements than is current doc-
trine.1 4 Second, such cases are very fact-specific. Third, non-compete law
is complicated and vague (and often involves a choice of law provision
selecting law different from that of the forum state).
8. Kramarsky, supra note 5, at 5.
9. Cathy Packer & Johanna Cleary, Rediscovering the Public Interest: An Analysis of
the Common Law Governing Post-Employment Non-Compete Contracts for Media Em-
ployees, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1073, 1077 (2007) ("The judicial outcomes [in
media employee non-compete cases] have been unpredictable, ad hoc, and heavily fact-
dependent, leaving media employers and employees alike lacking clear guidance on what
constitutes a legally acceptable non-compete contract."); M. Scott McDonald, Non-com-
pete Contracts: Understanding the Cost of Unpredictability, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.
137, 138 (2003) (noting the "unpredictability created by the current state of the law on non-
compete contracts ...."); Steven E. Harbour, Restrictions on Post-Employment Competi-
tion by an Executive Under Georgia Law, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1133, 1177 (2003) ("The law
in Georgia appears to be very unpredictable on the issue of how to treat a non-compete
provision in an employment agreement with an executive who had some bargaining
power."); Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A
Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Non-competes,
80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1243 (2001) (noting "the mounting problem of unpredictable and
inconsistent case results .... .
10. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Symposium: The Role of Contract in the Modern Em-
ployment Relationship: Non-competes, Human Capital, and Contract Formation: What Em-
ployment Law Can Learn from Family Law, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 155, 155 (2003).
11. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Visentin, No. 11 Civ. 399 (LAP), 2011 WL 672025, at *24
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), affd, 437 F. App'x 53 (2d Cir. 2011).
12. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Papermaster, No. 08-CV-9078 (KMK), 2008 WL
4974508, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2008).
13. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and
Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379,
381 (2006) (noting that non-compete agreements are frequently litigated). Estlund also
notes that the law regarding non-compete agreements "may have a built-in tendency to
generate complexity, indeterminacy, and, as a result, litigation." Id. at 383.
14. For example, as Professor Joseph Perillo has observed, when an employee cove-
nant not to compete is "reasonable" under applicable state law (and thus enforceable
under established legal doctrine), even appellate courts (which usually feel constrained to
justify their decisions in written opinions that are easily accessible in either reporters or
electronic databases) often find alternative bases to deny enforcement, bases that are noth-
ing more than (according to Professor Perillo) "flanking devices." Joseph M. Perillo,
Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept, 27 PAC. L.J. 37, 88-89 (1995).
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This Article proposes, however, that the unpredictable nature is also
caused by individual trial judges having different theories of why con-
tracts are (or should be) enforced. Without question, an employee cove-
nant not to compete case is one of those "hard cases that [is] radically
undetermined by legal rules." 15 Thus, trial judges deciding such disputes
have substantial discretion, and this Article proposes that judges use that
discretion (consciously or subconsciously) to implement (as a factor) their
particular theory of contract law in spite of applicable legal doctrine. 16
Part I of this Article discusses why contracts scholars seek to develop a
theory of contract law and discusses the varying theories proposed by
such scholars as to why contracts are (or should be) enforced. Part II
discusses employee covenants not to compete and when they are gener-
ally enforceable under established legal doctrine. Part III discusses how
trial court judges are able to use, as a factor, their theory of contract law
when deciding disputes involving an employee covenant not to compete.
Part IV analyzes how judges who adopt each theory would likely respond
to an employee covenant not to compete case.
II. CONTRACT THEORIES
Contracts scholars have devoted considerable attention to creating a
so-called "theory of contract law."' 17 This effort to create such a theory
has focused on explaining why the legal system enforces contracts, 18 with
scholars seeking to discover contract law's "core," or in other words,
some single unifying theme to contract law19 (such theories have been
15. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO JURISPRUDENCE 34 (1990).
16. See generally HILLMAN, supra note 2, at 193-94 (discussing the possibility that dif-
ferent judges have different theories as to why contracts should be enforced).
17. Peter Benson, Introduction, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACr LAW 1, 1 (Peter Ben-
son ed., 2001) [hereinafter Benson, Introduction]; see also HILLMAN, supra note 2, at 1
("General conceptual accounts of the nature and role of contract law in modern society
flourish.").
18. See E. Allan Farnsworth, A Fable and A Quiz on Contracts, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC.
206, 208 (1987) ("The urge to have a 'theory' of contract law ... has led to an excess
emphasis by scholars on why promises are enforced."). The efforts have focused on those
reasons in addition to keeping the public peace. PERILLO, supra note 1, at 6. This effort is
distinct from determining why promises ought to be kept from a moral standpoint. "A
moral obligation is something we ought to do or refrain from doing." Barnett, Consent
Theory, supra note 1, at 296. In contrast, a legal obligation is a duty that "can be enforced
by the use or threat of legal force." Id.; see also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence
of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 713-14 (2007) ("[Tlhere is no direct and
reliable route from the content of interpersonal morality to the appropriate content of the
corresponding area of law. Legal domains may pursue normative purposes and principles
of their own that are not straightforwardly derived from interpersonal morality."). It is, of
course, generally accepted that there is a moral obligation to keep a promise. See Eisen-
berg, supra note 1, at 260 ("It is a premise of this discussion that there is a moral obligation
to keep a promise. Certainly that is so as a matter of social morality, and contributions by
various philosophers, including importantly Thomas Scanlon, go toward showing that it is
so as a matter of critical morality. Given that premise, the issue is whether there should
also be a legal obligation to keep a promise ... ").
19. Inasmuch as a "theory" is the "abstract principles of a body of fact," MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1296 (11th ed. 2003), a theory of contract law must
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described as "single-value" theories).20 To be sure, this effort might be
futile, with no single explanation existing as to why contracts are en-
forced.21 Nevertheless, the effort (particularly over the past forty years)
has been undertaken with considerable zeal. The first subpart below dis-
cusses some of the reasons why contracts scholars might have devoted so
much attention to trying to identify a unifying basis for contract law. The
second subpart discusses what might be an unintended benefit of contract
theorists' efforts to create a unified theory of contract law. The third sub-
part discusses the different theories proposed by scholars as to why courts
enforce (or should enforce) contracts.
A. WHY CONTRACTS SCHOLARS SEEK TO IDENTIFY A UNIFYING
BASIS FOR CONTRACT LAW
Although contract doctrine is largely settled,22 contracts scholars have
been unable to agree on why the legal system enforces contracts. 23 As
discussed below, there are likely several reasons why contracts scholars
have devoted so much attention to this issue.
necessarily reduce the complex body of contract doctrines (which is the body of fact) to a
few principles. This effort by contracts scholars is reminiscent of Christopher Columbus
Langdell's notion that law is a science and that any field of law can be reduced to a few
fundamental principles. See C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACrs vi (1871) ("Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doc-
trines .... [T]he number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is commonly
supposed .... "). Contract scholars who seek a unifying theme for contract law have,
however, gone beyond Langdell's idea, inasmuch as these scholars have sought to isolate a
single fundamental principle to explain contract law (such as the morality of promising or
efficiency), not simply a set of principles.
20. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 223.
21. See Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRAcT LAW
118, 118 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) [hereinafter Benson, Unity] ("The point has come when
we appear to doubt the value and indeed the very possibility of a coherent and morally
plausible general theory of contract, one that could gain wide acceptance."); CHARLES
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 3 (1981) ("[I]t is a point of some of these critics [of the
concept of "contract as promise"] (for example, Friedman, Gilmore, Macneil) that the
search for a central or unifying principle of contract is a will-o'-the wisp, an illusion typical
of the ill-defined but much excoriated vice of conceptualism."). Contract theory can, of
course, have a normative goal instead of an explanatory role. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra
note 1, at 206 ("[T]he theory of contracts could be a theory of what the content of contract
law is, or a theory of what the content of contract law should be."). Many contract theories
straddle the line between explanatory and normative. See Brian H. Bix, Contract Law
Theory 8, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=892783 ("Most such theories sit uneasily be-
tween description and prescription/evaluation. On one hand, they purport to fit most of
the existing rules and practices; on the other hand, they re-characterize the practices to
make them as coherent and/or as morally attractive as possible."). No unitary contract
theory can explain every contract doctrine-for example, the objective theory of contract
formation, the consideration requirement, and the expectation damages rule cause particu-
lar problems for contract theorists-and thus contract theorists are usually left to argue
that some contract doctrines are "wrong." Of course, the more doctrines that are "wrong"
according to a particular contract theory, the more the theory appears to be a normative
theory than an explanatory theory. But few if any contract theories seek to stray too far
from the realm of the explanatory.
22. Benson, Introduction, supra note 17, at 1.
23. See supra note 1.
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1. Enhancing Our Understanding of Contract Law
Most obviously, a unified theory would enhance our understanding of
contract law24 by showing how "the rules 'hang together' in a coherent
framework. ' 25 This understanding could then be put to several uses.
First, such an understanding would promote the law's legitimacy by dem-
onstrating "the internal consistency and reasonableness which the law
claims for its doctrines and principles. '26 Second, such an understanding
could identify current contract doctrines or court decisions that are
anomalous and that should therefore be rejected or modified as part of
an effort to promote consistency in the law.27 Third, such an understand-
ing could provide guidance to judges when deciding hard cases. 28 Fourth,
such an understanding could have predictive implications, helping law-
yers and their clients predict how a court will decide a particular case.
Fifth, such an understanding would have explanatory implications, help-
ing to explain past court decisions.
24. See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 5 (2004) ("Interpretive theories aim
to enhance understanding of the law .... ); HILLMAN, supra note 2, at xiii (noting that
theories of contract law "have deepened the understanding of... the nature and functions
of modern contract law."); Benson, Introduction, supra note 17, at 118 ("Unless we are
able to make explicit the conception of contract that underlies [contract] doctrines and
principles, we do not fully understand them and whatever understanding we may have of
them must of necessity be partial and deficient."); Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract,
46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 553 (1933) ("[T]he meaning of a technical doctrine receives illumi-
nation when we see it in the light of those wider ideas of which it is the logical outcome.").
25. RANDY A. BARNETT-, PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT LAW xviii (4th ed. 2009) [here-
inafter BARNETT, PERSPECTIVES].
26. Benson, Unity, supra note 21, at 118.
27. See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 1, at 321 ("A better understanding of
contractual obligation should ultimately result in rules and principles of contract that bet-
ter facilitate the important social need to make and rely upon enforceable commitments.").
But see F. H. BUCKLEY, THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 3 (1999) ("A
good many things might contribute to a change in legal rules, and new legal theories do not
top the list."). Such a use of a contract theory is controversial. Usually, a theory is devel-
oped to explain a set of facts, not to announce certain facts to be wrong. But providing a
body of law that appears consistent is presumably important to maintaining the legitimacy
of the common law in the eyes of the public. Of course, the more anomalies that are
identified, and the more central they are to contract law, the more likely it is these anoma-
lies will be used to undermine the support for the general theory being proposed. As
noted by Stephen A. Smith, "The most obvious criterion for assessing interpretive theories
is whether they fit the data they are trying to explain." SMITH, supra note 24, at 7; see also
Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 1, at 270 (noting that one of the criteria for assessing a
proposed theory includes "the number of known problems the theory handles as well or
better than its rivals" and "the centrality of the problems that the theory handles well.").
An important aspect of determining whether there are such anomalies is defining "contract
law," and whether it includes concepts such as quasi-contracts and promissory estoppel.
28. See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 1, at 270 (noting that a theory helps solve
future problems and provide an answer "for those cases at the margin where our intuitions
are [not very] secure."); BARNETT, PERSPECTIVES, supra note 25, at xix (noting that con-
tract theory permits one to make a legal claim when there is not applicable doctrine). But
see Farnsworth, supra note 18, at 208 ("The fable teaches that contemporary contracts the-
ories have profoundly transformed the legal profession. (They have not.)").
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2. Maintaining a Division Between Contract Law and Tort Law (or,
Conversely, Assimilating Contract Law with Tort Law)
The common law of civil obligations is generally divided into three doc-
trinal categories:2 9 (1) contract duties, 30 which are generally considered
self-imposed obligations that are enforced to avoid defeating the expecta-
tions of the right-holder;31 (2) tort duties, which are generally considered
imposed by society and that are enforced to avoid harm to the right-
holder;32 and (3) restitution duties, which are designed to avoid unjust
29. See FRIED, supra note 21, at 69 ("We have already encountered the two competing
residuary principles of civil obligation that take over when promise gives out: the tort prin-
ciple to compensate for harm done, and the restitution principle for benefits conferred.").
Fried also referred to the principle of "sharing," id. at 70, but there is no general common-
law legal duty to share, though such a legal duty is imposed to an extent through welfare
legislation, and might also be a moral duty. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971). In this sense, Fried differs from those libertarians "who deny that the state
is ever justified in forcibly redistributing wealth from one individual or group to another,"
Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 473 (1980),
such as Friedrich Hayek and Richard Nozick. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITU-
TION OF LIBERTY (1961); RICHARD NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). Al-
though Fried supports a general redistributive welfare scheme, he does not believe such
redistribution should take place through contract law. FRIED, supra note 21, at 71-72, 106.
He does, however, support increased sharing of losses under the doctrines of mistake, frus-
tration, and impossibility. See id. at 70-71. See generally Kronman, supra, at 473-74 (foot-
notes omitted) ("The libertarian's opposition to the use of contract law as a mechanism for
redistribution derives from his general belief that the compulsory transfer of wealth is
theft, regardless of how it is accomplished. By contrast, liberals who oppose the use of
contract law as a redistributive device do so because they believe that distributional objec-
tives (whose basic legitimacy they accept) are always better achieved through the tax sys-
tem than through the detailed regulation of individual transactions.").
30. Here and elsewhere in this Article, I use the term "duty" in the sense of indicating
a correlative "right" held by the person to whom the duty is owed. See Curtis Nyquist,
Teaching Wesley Hohfeld's Theory of Legal Relations, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 238, 239 (2002);
Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 YALE L.J. 16, 31 (1913).
31. Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 129 (2000)
("Another common belief holds that ... contract law enforces only those duties that a
party has voluntarily assumed."); Patrick Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obli-
gations, 94 L.Q. REV. 193 (1978), reprinted in A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 78, 78 (Peter
Linzer ed., 1995) [hereinafter ANTHOLOGY] (noting that the law of contracts is generally
considered to be based on obligations that are voluntarily assumed). But see Jean
Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 700-01 (1990) ("Use of the concept of consent seems to be
inevitable in explanations and justifications of the law of contract. Consent itself, however,
is a conclusion based on a complex set of normative judgments; consent is not a simple
description of fact. In the event of a dispute between contracting parties, some external
power must first decide whether the parties have consented in a valid manner and, if so,
determine the scope of the consent. Legal decision makers, serving collective societal
norms, construct consent. This process is unavoidably a means of regulation, one which
fosters one view or another of beneficial contractual relations. Consent will not work as a
rationale to enforce contracts without also bringing in social control of the parties' affairs
in the event of dispute.") (footnotes omitted).
32. See FRIED, supra note 21, at 57-58 (referring to tort principles as "collectively
determined grounds of resolution"); Rick Swedloff & Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages and
the New Science of Happiness, 85 IND. L.J. 553, 578 (2010) (noting that tort law compen-
sates for harm done); Atiyah, supra note 31, at 78, 80 (noting that tort law is generally
considered to be based on obligations imposed by law, and that tort law's "immediate
object of interest" is "the causing of damage or injury").
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enrichment at the expense of the right-holder. 33 Some contracts scholars
desire to maintain a clear division among these categories of civil obliga-
tion and in particular a division between contract duties and tort duties.34
If there is, in fact, a distinctive law of "contracts" (creating "contract du-
ties"), then there presumably is an organizing principle or "intelligible
order" to contract law.35 Otherwise, there would arguably not be a dis-
tinctive law of "contracts" but perhaps (if moving to a greater level of
generality) just a law of "civil obligations. ' 36 Thus, driven by the belief
that there is such a thing as an enclave of "contract law" within the law of
civil obligations, and in reaction to those who argue contract law and tort
law are essentially the same, these scholars have devoted tremendous en-
ergy to identifying a theory of contract law that renders contract law dis-
tinct from the other categories of civil obligation, and, in particular, tort
law. Conversely, some scholars might desire an assimilation of contract
law with tort law and therefore assert a unifying theme of contract law
that is the same as tort law's unifying theme. 37
Of course, desiring a clear division between contract law and tort law
(or seeking to assimilate contract law with tort law) does not explain the
motive for such a desire. Some scholars presumably fear that an assimila-
tion of contract law and tort law will have damaging effects upon estab-
lished contract doctrine. 38 For those who seek to assimilate contract law
into tort law, the effects would be (in their minds) beneficial. To under-
stand what effects such assimilation could perhaps have, it is necessary to
recognize the fundamental differences between contract law and tort law.
It is also necessary to recognize that the effects of assimilation are gener-
ally considered to be contract law assimilating into tort law, not vice
versa.
39
33. See Atiyah, supra note 31, at 80 (noting that restitution law's "immediate object of
interest" is "the rendering of benefits on the other").
34. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87 (1974) (stating that
"[c]lassical contract theory might well be described as an attempt to stake out an enclave
within the general domain of tort."); FRIED, supra note 21, at 25 ("Here it is sufficient to
introduce the notion that contract as promise has a distinct but neither exclusive nor neces-
sarily dominant place among legal and moral principles. A major concern of this book is
the articulation of the boundaries and connection between the promissory and other prin-
ciples of justice.").
35. See SMITH, supra note 24, at 5 (noting that the goal of contract theory is to reveal
an "intelligible order").
36. Or, if moving to a greater level of specificity, a law of sales contracts, insurance
contracts, employment contracts, family contracts, etc.
37. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 21, at 4-5 (arguing that reliance theorists seek to assim-
ilate contract into tort and to subordinate "a quintessentially individualistic ground for
obligation and form of social control, one that refers to the will of the parties, to a set of
standards that are ineluctably collective in origin and thus readily turned to collective
ends.").
38. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 21, at 4 ("If we assimilate contractual obligation to the
law of torts, our focus shifts to the injury suffered by the plaintiff and to the fairness of
saddling the defendant with some or all of it.").
39. Of course, the rise of strict liability in tort law would be an example of tort law
assimilating into contract law.
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First, contract liability is strict liability, 40 whereas tort liability is usually
(but not always) based on fault. 41 Thus, an assimilation of contract law
with tort law might result in a shift (for contract law) away from a strict
liability standard and toward a fault-based standard. If this occurred, the
non-performance of a contract duty could be more easily excused than
under a strict liability standard. This would in turn decrease the ability of
parties to rely on contracts and perhaps also undermine the moral obliga-
tion to keep one's commitments. Second, the remedial schemes of tort
law and contract law are different. Tort liability compensates for harm
done and thus seeks to put the plaintiff in her pre-injury position (in this
sense tort law is backward looking),42 whereas contract liability puts the
promisee in the position she would have been in had the promise been
kept (in this sense contract law is forward looking).43 Tort liability can
also include emotional distress damages44 and punitive damages, 45
whereas contract liability generally does not include such recoveries, even
for an intentional breach.4 6 To the extent these different remedial
schemes are designed to implement different goals, an assimilation of
remedies might undermine contract law's and tort law's different pur-
poses.47 It would also have the effect of rendering wholly executory con-
tracts (contracts where neither party has relied on the other party's
promised performance) essentially unenforceable because there would be
no damages.48 Third, tort liability is based on what the community con-
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, introductory note (1981)
("Contract liability is strict liability.").
41. Alfred C. Yen, Torts and the Construction of Inducement and Contributory Liabil-
ity in Amazon and Visa, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 513, 518 (2009); see also FRIED, supra
note 21, at 55 (referring to "all the usual tort qualifications regarding reasonableness").
42. Swedloff & Huang, supra note 32, at 578.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981). In fact, the expectation
damages rule has been referred to as perhaps the "most basic" principle of contract law
and "the distinctive hallmark of contract law." Benson, Introduction, supra note 17, at 2, 3.
44. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
362-63 (1984).
45. See id. at 9 ("Where the defendant's wrongdoing has been intentional and deliber-
ate, and has the character of outrage frequently associated with crime, all but a few courts
have permitted the jury to award in the tort action 'punitive' or 'exemplary' damages, or
what is sometimes called 'smart money.'").
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981) ("Recovery for emo-
tional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the con-
tract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly
likely result."); id. § 355 ("Punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract
unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are
recoverable."). In fact, under the so-called "efficient breach" theory, scholars maintain
that certain breaches are efficient and should therefore be encouraged. See A. MITCHELL
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCnON TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 33-36 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing
the efficient breach theory).
47. For example, contract law's remedial scheme is considered so important that some
casebooks start with remedies. See, e.g., JoHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND
COMMENT 2 (9th ed. 2008).
48. The non-breaching party could still perhaps be awarded nominal damages. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346(2) (1981) ("If the breach caused no loss...




siders appropriate behavior,49 whereas contract liability is generally
based on voluntarily imposed duties.50 Liability based on community no-
tions of appropriate behavior provides greater justification for state inter-
ference with the free market.51 If contract law is considered to involve
nothing more than society imposing legal duties on a person for policy
reasons, then there can be fewer objections to contract doctrines impos-
ing restrictions on so-called "freedom of contract." For example, tort no-
tions would permit courts to review contracts for their fairness through
expanded use of current contract doctrines such as unconscionability. 52
Thus, those who seek to maintain a separate enclave for contract law-
distinct from tort law or a general law of civil obligations-presumably
believe strongly in freedom of contract and fear that assimilating contract
law with tort law would threaten that ideal.
3. Maintaining a Separation Between Law and Politics
Although it is indisputable that the judiciary makes law in a common
law system,53 this notion has proved sufficiently troubling that considera-
ble efforts have been made to render the judicial lawmaking process dis-
tinct from lawmaking by the legislative branch.5 4 A unified theory of
contract law (if followed by the courts) would help minimize judicial dis-
cretion and thus render the decision-making process less like politics and
49. See FRIED, supra note 21, at 57 (referring to tort principles as "collectively deter-
mined grounds of resolution").
50. Craswell, supra note 31, at 129 ("Another common belief holds that tort law im-
poses duties without regard to a party's consent, while contract law enforces only those
duties that a party has voluntarily assumed.").
51. See FRIED, supra note 21, at 4-5 (stating that the "assimilation of contract to tort is
(and for writers like Gilmore, Horowitz, and Atiyah is intended to be) the subordination of
a quintessentially individualist ground for obligation and form of social control, one that
refers to the will of the parties, to a set of standards that are ineluctably collective in origin
and thus readily turned to collective ends.") (footnotes omitted).
52. See id. at 75 ("Once we admit that bargains may be overturned or revised because
of an imbalance in advantages of this sort, the way lies open to review and revise agree-
ments generally in terms of their fairness.").
53. RICHARD POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 153 (2008). For an excellent discussion of
the distinction between a common law system and a civil law system, see BARRY
NICHOLAS, THE FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 4-23 (2d ed. 2005).
54. For example, Professor Eisenberg has argued that "given the removal of the courts
from ordinary political processes, the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking depends in large
part on the employment of a process of reasoning that begins with the society's standards,
rather than with those standards a judge personally thinks best as a matter of critical mo-
rality." Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 245. Professor Morton Horwitz has argued that in the
nineteenth century, legal thinkers desired to create an autonomous legal order that would
provide a clear separation between law and politics. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 10 (1992). They sought to do this "through a
process of systemization, integration, and abstraction of legal doctrine [by] refin[ing] and
tighten[ing] up what had previously been a loosely arranged, ad hoc system of legal classifi-
cation." Id. In other words, they devoted their efforts to creating reductionist theories of
law. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 60 (1979). Similarly, in response to
arguments in the 1970s that contract law and tort law were being assimilated, so-called
neoformalists "who objected[ed] to the modernist's politicization of private law ... pro-
pose[d] a return to the traditional ideal of the law as an independent discipline." BUCK-
LEY, supra note 27, at 2.
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more like applying established law. As stated by Professor Melvin Eisen-
berg, "[t]he attractions of single-value [contract] theories are obvious.
[T]hey appear capable of producing determinate results, and because
they are single-value theories, they appear to avoid the dissonance caused
by conflicting values and the difficulties produced if conflicting values
need to be accommodated.15 5 Thus, some scholars presumably seek a
unified theory of contract law as part of an effort to promote judicial
restraint, fueled by the belief that, even with respect to the common law,
the judicial branch's decision-making process should be less political than
the legislative process. These scholars likely believe that the judicial
branch, without broad investigatory powers, is not as competent as the
legislature to decide policy questions; 56 that the judiciary is not as ac-
countable as the legislature;57 and that the judiciary's lawmaking should
be constrained due to its retroactive effect on the parties.58
Of course, a weakness in the "law and politics separation" argument is
that policy likely played a role in the original adoption of established con-
tract doctrine59 and thus identifying a contract theory that explains cur-
rent doctrine simply preserves a status quo that was originally formulated
for policy reasons. Also, identifying a unified theory of contract law, al-
though appearing to be a neutral process, is itself likely influenced by the
theorist's political leanings (in other words, we often see what we want to
see).
4. Promoting a Political Ideology
Some scholars perhaps seek to identify a unified theory of contract law
because the unified theory promotes their political ideology.60 For exam-
ple, a scholar might argue that the basis of contract law is the moral obli-
gation to keep a promise as part of an effort to promote a libertarian
political viewpoint. 61 This motive is the opposite of the "law and politics
separation" argument discussed above, but these scholars presumably
would support judicial restraint once the favorable unified theory has
55. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 240.
56. See BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 3 (noting that courts may "be less able than legisla-
tures to assess the consequences of a legal change, since appellate advocacy is not a partic-
ularly good method of weighing empirical evidence.").
57. See id. (noting that "[clourts are less accountable than legislatures and less subject
to sanction when they embark on a judicial frolic.").
58. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 245 (noting concern with the retroactivity of judicial
lawmaking).
59. See, e.g., Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Story in the Industrialization of
Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 283-84 (1975) (arguing that the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale
was a product of nineteenth century economic conditions); Jay M. Feinman, The Develop-
ment of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 135 (1976) (asserting that
the rise of the employment at will doctrine was the result of advanced capitalism).
60. For example, Professor Jay Feinman has argued that "[m]etatheory is the scholar-
ship of the right, using claims of scientific or philosophical objectivity in support of con-
servative politics." Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1283, 1318 (1990).
61. See FRIED, supra note 21, at 1.
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been established so as to avoid a change in the theory.62
B. A (PERHAPS) UNINTENDED BENEFIT OF SCHOLARS' EFFORTS TO
CREATE A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW
Even if contract scholars' efforts to develop a theory of contract law
based on a single principle is futile, the effort will likely have an impor-
tant unintended benefit. If particular contract scholars believe that con-
tract law can be explained by a single principle, it is likely that some
judges also believe that contract law can be explained by a single princi-
ple (or at least that it is based primarily on a single principle). Accord-
ingly, the contract theories that have been advanced by contract scholars
are probably also followed by individual judges. This in turn will help
explain why judges reach decisions in particular contract law cases. This
Article now turns to the contract law theories that various contract schol-
ars have proposed with the understanding that such theories are likely
followed (even if not overtly or even consciously) by various judges and
that these theories influence their decisions in hard cases, such as a case
seeking to enforce an employee covenant not to compete.
C. CONTRACT THEORIES
The theories of contract law that have been proposed by contracts
scholars generally fall into the following categories: (1) the reliance and
restitution theory, (2) the will theory, (3) the consent theory, (4) the bar-
gain theory, (5) the efficiency theory, (6) the fairness theory, and (7) syn-
thesis theories. 63 Each is discussed below. As will be seen, the challenge
facing such theories is to provide a single basis for contract law that ade-
quately explains contract doctrines such as the objective theory of con-
62. It is sometimes difficult to determine whether a legal scholar is seeking to promote
a particular political viewpoint. For example, Professor Horwitz has argued that the late
nineteenth-century desire to separate law and politics was fueled by political motives. He
maintains that part of this effort involved creating a clear distinction between public law(which was coercive) and private law (which was not coercive and would be "resistant to
the dangers of political interference"), and that the goal was to "avoid the threat of co-
erced economic equality." HORwrrz, supra note 54, at 9-11. Horwitz argues that "per-
haps the most central tenet of late-nineteenth-century legal orthodoxy [was] its
commitment to a neutral, non-redistributive state." Id. at 16; see also GILMORE, supra note
34, at 7 (asserting that classical contract law was "in close historical relationship with the
free market of classical economic theory .... "); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACr
LAw IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE STUDY 20 (1965) (asserting that classi-
cal contract law was "roughly coextensive with the free market" and was a "deliberate
relinquishment of the temptation to restrict untrammeled individual autonomy or the com-
pletely free market in the name of social policy.").
63. See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 1, at 269-70 (identifying five theories: will
theory, reliance theory, fairness theory, efficiency theory, and bargain theory, and propos-
ing his own "consent theory"); PERLLO, supra note 1, at 9 (discussing synthesis theories).
The so-called "Wisconsin school," which argues that legal doctrines have little effect on
citizens' behavior, see SMITH, supra note 24, at 34, has not been included because it is not
truly a theory of contract law.
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tract formation,64 the doctrine that not all promises are enforceable (and
usually only those given as part of a bargained-for exchange), 65 and the
general rule that expectation damages are awarded 66 (with the effect of
rendering wholly executory contracts enforceable). 67 Also, as will be
seen, the viability of a theory often depends on whether certain doctrines
(such as quasi-contracts, promissory estoppel, and statutes regulating
contracting behavior) and practices (such as parties not usually enforcing
wholly executory contracts when there is no reliance or benefit provided
by the promisee) should be considered a part of "contract law."
1. Reliance and Restitution Theory
Some scholars believe that contract law's "core" is (or perhaps should
be) the protection of the promisee's reliance on the promisor's promise
(which would also include protecting the restitution interest for any bene-
fits provided to the promisor in reliance on the promise). 68 In fact, "the
earliest cases in which the courts of common law gave relief to promisees
were those in which damages had been incurred in reliance upon a
promise."69
When considering the reliance and restitution theory, it is important to
recognize the important relationship between this theory and the possible
assimilation of contract law into tort law. Because tort law is premised on
preventing harm,70 this theory (with its emphasis on protecting the prom-
isee's reliance) is generally associated (rightly or wrongly) with such an
assimilation, and in particular, a move for contract law toward commu-
nity-based notions of proper behavior.71 Thus, reliance theories should
perhaps be subdivided into (1) those who believe the reliance interest is
contract law's unifying theme but who do not believe contract law should
be assimilated with tort law and (2) those who believe the reliance inter-
64. Under the so-called objective theory of contract formation, a person is bound to a
contract if she manifested assent, even if she did not intend to assent. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 347.
67. See Benson, Introduction, supra note 17, at 2 (recognizing that the effect of award-
ing expectation damages is to render the wholly executory contract enforceable).
68. See PERILLO, supra note 1, at 8 ("Proponents of the reliance theory of contracts
profess to see the foundation of contract law not in the will of the promisor to be bound
but in the expectations engendered by, and the promisee's consequent reliance upon, the
promise."). It has been argued that enforcing promises per se, as opposed to enforcing
them only when the non-breaching party has suffered harm from the breach, potentially
conflicts with the so-called "harm principle." See Bix, supra note 21, at 9-10 n.23 ("Smith,
following Raz and others, also argues that enforcing contracts on the basis of promises
potentially violates 'the harm principle'-the view, associated with the work of John Stuart
Mill-that government is justified in infringing the liberties of its citizens only for the pur-
pose of preventing harm to others.").
69. See PERILLO, supra note 1, at 8.
70. See FRIED, supra note 21, at 4 ("[T]he law of torts is concerned with just the ques-
tion of compensation for harm caused by another .... ").
71. See id. at 4-5 (asserting that reliance theories seek to assimilate contract with tort
and to replace contract law's individualist grounds for obligation with obligation designed
to promote collective ends).
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est is contract law's unifying theme and who believe contract law should
be assimilated with tort law. For example, the former theory might not
support the enforcement of the wholly executory contract but would be-
lieve that if there has been reliance, non-performance should not easily
be excused. The latter theory would focus on whether the non-perform-
ance was "reasonable" and would support greater interference with free-
dom of contract than the former theory.
The idea that contract law's principal purpose is to protect the prom-
isee's so-called "reliance interest" can be traced to the 1930s.72 In 1936,
Professor Lon Fuller published perhaps the most famous contracts article
ever written, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,73 and it has been
noted that the popularity of modern reliance theories can be traced to
Fuller's piece. 74 Although the article focused on a limited issue-why the
standard remedy for the breach of a contract is an award of damages
designed to protect the promisee's so-called expectation interest-the ar-
ticle necessarily raised the general issue of why the legal system enforces
contracts. 75 Fuller speculated that the law awards expectation damages
not to protect the promisee's expectation of performance per se but to
protect the promisee's reliance on the promise.76 Although this seems
paradoxical, Fuller speculated that expectation damages were awarded
instead of reliance damages because the latter were often hard to prove
and were often the same as the expectation interest.77 According to
Fuller, awarding expectation damages would also deter breaches of con-
tract, and breaches cause reliance losses.78 Furthermore, awarding expec-
tation damages would encourage parties to rely on their contracts and
would thus promote value-enhancing exchanges.79 Fuller's argument was
particularly impressive because his assertion that contract law primarily
sought to protect the promisee's reliance interest was based on an expla-
nation of a particular contract doctrine-the award of expectation dam-
ages as the usual remedy for a breach-that appeared inconsistent with
72. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,
46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936). Although William R. Perdue, Jr., Fuller's research assistant, was
identified as a co-author, Perdue acknowledged that Fuller was responsible for the article's
theoretical component. BARNErF, PERSPECTIVES, supra note 25, at 4; see also Benson,
Introduction, supra note 17, at 1 n.1 (stating that Fuller is considered "to be the writer of
the article and certainly of its theoretical parts").
73. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 72. Barnett described the article as "the most
famous and oft-cited article on contract law ever written." BARNE-r, PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 25, at 3.
74. SMITH, supra note 24, at 78; see also FRIED, supra note 21, at 4 ("Proceeding from a
theme established in Lon Fuller and William Perdue's influential 1936 article, a number of
writers have argued that often what is taken as enforcement of a promise is in reality the
compensation of an injury sustained by the plaintiff because he relied on the defendant's
promise.").
75. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 72, at 53 ("[I]t is impossible to separate the law of
contract damages from the larger body of motives and policies which constitute the general
law of contracts.").
76. Id. at 60.
77. Id.





The idea that contract law was primarily designed to protect the prom-
isee's reliance interest returned in the 1970s, and this time the arguments
were, to many, alarming.81 In the early part of that decade, Professor
Grant Gilmore argued that the prominence given to promissory estoppel
in the American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Contracts
meant that promissory estoppel had "swallowed up" the bargained-for
exchange theory as contract law's core. 82 According to Gilmore, after the
general acceptance of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the only use
for the bargained-for exchange basis for enforcing a promise would be
the wholly executory contract, and even then it was recognized by the
American Law Institute that the "probability of reliance lends support to
the enforcement of the executory exchange. ' 83 He also argued that dur-
ing the same time period, recovery based on restitution had gained
favor.84
Gilmore stopped short, however, of arguing that the bargained-for ex-
change theory as the basis for enforcing a promise had been completely
banished by promissory estoppel and quasi-contract (restitution).
Rather, he maintained, for example, that the Second Restatement of
Contracts had a schizophrenic quality about it much like the First Re-
statement (recognizing bargained-for exchange, reliance, and restitution
as bases for enforcement) but that the Second Restatement's recognition
of the strength of the reliance and restitution interests was now overt
(unlike the First Restatement). 85 Gilmore believed that the emphasis on
the promisee's reliance and restitution interests meant that contract law
was "being reabsorbed into the mainstream of 'tort." 86 He famously ar-
gued that:
[wle are fast approaching the point where, to prevent unjust enrich-
ment, any benefit received by a defendant must be paid for unless it
was clearly meant as a gift; where any detriment reasonably incurred
by a plaintiff in reliance on a defendant's assurances must be recom-
pensed. When that point is reached, there is really no longer any
viable distinction between liability in contract and liability in tort....
[T]he two fields, which had been artificially set apart, are gradually
merging and becoming one. 87
80. Id.
81. GILMORE, supra note 34, at 72; see also Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 1, at
274 n.17 (noting that a reliance theory of contract "clearly underlies Gilmore's seminal
work, The Death of Contract.").
82. GILMORE, supra note 34, at 72.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 72-74.
85. Id. at 75-76.
86. Id. at 87.
87. Id. at 88 (footnote omitted). The difficulty with Gilmore's argument, however, is
that promissory estoppel has not subsumed contract law. For example, courts have been
hesitant to impose liability as a result of pre-contract assurances. See Robert E. Scott,
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Myth of Precontractual Reliance, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 71,
91 (2007) (noting that promissory estoppel claims have generally been unsuccessful when
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Thus, what was significant about Gilmore's thesis (and how it differed
from Fuller's) was that it did not simply suggest that protecting the reli-
ance interest was contract law's primary aim; it suggested that contract
law and tort law were merging. This is what made Gilmore's thesis
alarming. If contract law and tort law were becoming one, then the ef-
fects described earlier with respect to such assimilation might occur.
In the late 1970s, Professor Patrick S. Atiyah developed more fully the
ideas of Fuller and Gilmore, 88 arguing that "the nature of contractual and
promissory liability have been largely misunderstood by lawyers, philoso-
phers, and others." 89 He argued that the wholly executory contract
(whose enforcement could only be explained on promissory principles)
was the focus of too much attention by contract theorists and that con-
tracts that had been partly performed or otherwise relied upon were far
more common and thus should be the focus of any theory of contract
law.90 He believed that this preoccupation with the wholly executory
contract had led classical contract law to become overly preoccupied with
the promisor's intentions instead of the promisee's reliance or the provid-
ing of benefits.91 Atiyah argued that wholly executory contracts were
rare and that contract law's core was therefore not the promisor's prom-
ise or the promisee's expectation interest, but the protection of the prom-
isee's reliance and restitution interests.92
Atiyah further argued that since the late nineteenth century lawyers
have been too preoccupied with the distinction between contract, tort,
and restitution (i.e., quasi-contract). 93 For example, he asserted that:
until the middle of the nineteenth century at least, the common law-
yers distinguished between express and implied contracts not be-
tween contracts and quasi-contracts. To the early common lawyers,
the important point in common between express and implied con-
tracts was that both usually involved a claim for payment or reim-
bursement for a benefit which had been conferred by the plaintiff on
the defendant. 94
Atiyah argued that contract law's principal purpose-the protection of
the reliance and restitution interests-made it not so different from tort
the plaintiff seeks to impose liability based on assurances made during contract
negotiations).
88. For example, Atiyah stated in the introduction to his book, The Rise and Fall of
Freedom of Contract: "But I must express my greatest indebtedness to the article by Fuller
and Perdue, 'The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,' ...... In many respects, this
article has been the starting-point for the whole of this book." P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE
AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACr 1 n.1 (1979) thereinafter ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL].
89. Id. Atiyah has been described as "perhaps the most forceful critic of [the contract
as promise] approach ...." KIMEL, supra note 1, at 2. In 1981, however, with Atiyah's
publication of Promises, Morals, and Law, Atiyah "added his voice to those who view
contract and promise as analogous institutions." Id.
90. Atiyah, supra note 31, at 82-83.
91. Id. at 82-84.
92. Id. at 82-85.
93. Id. at 78-79.
94. Id. at 90.
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law and restitution law.95
Atiyah took aim at the idea that contract law was primarily based on
the voluntary assumption of a duty, the traditionally-stated distinction be-
tween contract duties and tort duties. 96 He used history to support his
claim, characterizing the "will theory" (which argued that contract law
was based on the voluntary assumption of a duty)97 as simply a detour in
the history of contract law to serve the political and economic climate of
the nineteenth century.98 Atiyah argued that the late nineteenth century
model was based on that of the free market. 99 It was based on "[f]ree
choice in all things, rational planning, calculated risk assessment, and the
severest limitation of the active role of State and judge . . . ."100 Restitu-
tion, with its benefit-based theory, therefore had to be banished from
contract law.101
Atiyah maintained, however, that "[t]raditionally, a contract was pri-
marily conceived as a relationship involving mutual rights and obliga-
tions; there was not necessarily an implication that the relationship was
created by a conscious and deliberate act of will, still less that the rights
and duties thereby generated were the creatures of the will.' 0 2 He as-
serted that:
[t]he extreme individualism, the belief that all prices are a matter
of subjective choice, the stress on will and intention, of the nine-
teenth century were not found in the law of the eighteenth century to
any significant degree.... Throughout the greater part of the [eight-
eenth] century, 'law was conceived of as protective, regulative, pater-
nalistic, and above all, a paramount expression of the moral sense of
the community."1 0 3
Atiyah also argued that "[t]he notion that a promisee was entitled to
have his expectations protected, purely and simply as such, as a result of a
promise and nothing else, was not generally accepted in eighteenth cen-
tury law,"'01 4 and he suggested that expectation damages did not become
the measure of damages until the nineteenth century.'0 5
95. Id. at 91.
96. Id. at 79.
97. See infra notes 131-61 and accompanying text (discussing the will theory of
contract).
98. Atiyah, supra note 31, at 79.
99. Id. at 81.
100. Id. at 90.
101. Id.; see also HORWITZ, supra note 54, at 15 (noting that part of the effort to genera-
lize and systematize contract law around the will theory included "William Keener pub-
lish[ing] a book on Quasi-Contract in 1893 for the purpose of isolating a paternalistic, non-
will-based set of doctrines from a pure and supposedly voluntaristic system of contract
law.").
102. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 88, at 37.
103. Id. at 167-68 (quoting Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 251, 257 (1975)).
104. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 88, at 142. This assertion is disputed. See
William M. McGovern, Jr., Book Note, 66 MINN. L. REV. 550, 552 (1982).
105. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 88, at 456. This assertion is also disputed.
McGovern, supra note 104, at 552-53.
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Atiyah, however, did not simply rely on history. He made the norma-
tive argument that a loss of expectations was not comparable to a pecuni-
ary loss through reliance or providing a benefit. 106 He also argued that
the will theory did not fit with current contract doctrine. 107 For example,
he argued that there were times when providing a benefit, without a prior
or subsequent promise, would permit a recovery under quasi-contract 3 8
To Atiyah, this showed that it was not the promise that was doing most of
the work in the law of contracts, particularly because wholly executory
contracts were rare. 10 9 Further, he saw the law of misrepresentation,
warranty, and estoppel as reliance-based. 110 He also believed a promise-
based theory could not be reconciled with the objective theory of con-
tracts.'11 Additionally, the arrival of form contracts rendered the objec-
tive theory far more important than it had been in the world of simple
promises and contracts. 112
But if contract law was not primarily based on the promisor's promise,
Atiyah had to explain why a promise is a necessary element of contrac-
tual liability. He argued that the promise plays primarily an evidentiary
role in resolving ambiguities about the nature of the transaction, such as
whether a benefit was provided as a gift, who the parties were to the
contract, whether there had been performance by the other side, and the
amount provided in the case of money. 113 The promise also provides
prima facie evidence of the fairness of the transaction and the appropri-
ate price to be paid.1 4 Atiyah believed this was an "indispensable tool of
efficient administration in a free market society ... [f]or any other rule
would leave it open to a dissatisfied party to any and every transaction to
appeal to a judge to upset an agreed price and fix a new one." 115
In arguing that the promisor's promise was not the primary basis for
enforcing a contract, Atiyah was also left to explain the enforcement of
the wholly executory contract. He argued that traditionally (until the late
eighteenth century), enforcement of wholly executory contracts was not
promise-based, but reliance- or benefit-based, because the promisee re-
mained liable to perform his or her end of the bargain.1 6 In other words,
the promisee's duty to perform was not discharged by the other party's
breach." 7 Thus, liability was premised on the promisee having to provide
a benefit to the other side."18
106. Atiyah, supra note 31, at 83.
107. Id. at 83-84.
108. Id. at 83.
109. Id. at 84.
110. Id. at 83.
111. Id. at 83-84.
112. Id. at 84.
113. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 88, at 144.
114. Atiyah, supra note 31, at 85.
115. Id.





With respect to modern law, which enforces the other party's promise
but discharges the promisee's duty to perform upon a breach (provided
that the breach is material and total),1 19 Atiyah acknowledged that this
form of liability (with respect to an executory contract) had to be prom-
ise-based, but he maintained that it should not occupy "the central role in
Contract and even in promissory theory that it occupies today."'120
Atiyah argued that (1) wholly executory contracts are rare; (2) most con-
tracts are quickly relied upon or performed; (3) the primary purpose of
contracts is to establish the terms if there is performance, not to bind the
parties to perform a wholly executory contract; (4) wholly executory con-
tracts are not generally considered by the parties to be binding; 121 and (5)
as a result of the market price/contract price differential for breach of
sale of goods contracts there was often no recovery (and thus such con-
tracts could be breached with impunity), and that in practice this must be
a high proportion of cases where a wholly executory contract is
breached. 22 Atiyah also argued that people today have less respect for
the sanctity of a promise than a century ago.' 23
Additionally, Atiyah responded to various arguments in favor of the
enforceability of the wholly executory contract. First, although an argu-
ment could be made that a promisee's reasonable expectation of per-
formance should be protected, he argued that many expectations are not
protected by law. 124 If such a promisee's expectation of performance was
not protected by law, it would be less reasonable to expect perform-
ance. 125 Also, in other areas of law-such as torts-reasonable expecta-
tions are not protected until relied upon.126 Further, although a
disappointed expectation of performance could be considered harmful,
psychological injuries are generally not protected in law.'2 7 Additionally,
at least with respect to business entities, it would not make sense to refer
to a psychological injury.128 Atiyah argued that even though protecting
expectations might be justified with respect to contracts that are deliber-
ate exercises in risk allocation, not all contracts are of such a nature, and
it could be argued that even with respect to such contracts reliance should
be necessary to enforceability.1 29 With respect to the argument that a
promise creates a moral obligation to perform, Atiyah suggested that it
was odd to believe "that a bare promise creates a moral obligation and
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 237 (1981) (providing that a mate-
rial breach suspends non-breaching party's remaining contract duties); id. § 242 (providing
factors relevant to determining when non-breaching party's remaining contract duties are
discharged).
120. Atiyah, supra note 31, at 86.
121. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 88, at 756.
122. Atiyah, supra note 31, at 86.
123. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 88, at 655.
124. Atiyah, supra note 31, at 87.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 88.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. ATiYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 88, at 5.
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should create a legal obligation, without any inquiry into the reason for
which the promise was given, or the effect that the promise has had. '130
In conclusion, Atiyah believed that while "[o]ur very process of
thought, our language in political, moral or philosophical debate, is still
dominated by th[e] nineteenth-century heritage" that produced the will
theory of contracts,' 3t these conceptions "do not reflect the value of our
own times. 1 32 He wanted a recognition that the reliance-based and resti-
tution-based concepts that pre-dated the will theory were "ideas, . . . at
least intuitively or implicitly, gaining much ground today."'
33
2. Will Theory
In the nineteenth century, contract theorists proposed the so-called
"will theory."'1 34 Under the will theory, contractual obligation was based
on the parties freely assuming the obligation, and a so-called "meeting of
the minds. ' 135 Although the idea of contract being based on the parties'
consent was not novel, the will theory was different in that it maintained
that the voluntary nature of contractual obligation was all that mat-
tered. 136 Called "classical contract law" by some, it "embodied the di-
chotomy between individual and community by imagining a realm of
private agreement in which individual freedom was protected from state
coercion. 1 37 Rules regarding formation and the requirement of consid-
eration "assured that the individual actually had consented to a bar-
gained-for exchange."'1 38 Under this theory of contract law, "the judge
simply carried out the will of the contracting parties. '13 9
The will theory of contract-and its logical corollary, a subjective ap-
proach to contract formation-never found much traction with the courts
in the United States,140 and it fizzled as a contract theory largely because
it was inconsistent with the objective theory of contract formation, which
was needed in "an increasingly national corporate economy ... 141
130. Atiyah, supra note 31, at 90.
131. Id. at 79.
132. Id.
133. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 88, at 6.
134. James Gordley, The Moral Foundations of Private Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 16
(2002); HORWTZ, supra note 54, at 13.
135. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 1, at 300; HORWITZ, supra note 54, at 35.
136. Gordley, supra note 134, at 16-17.
137. Feinman, supra note 60, at 1286.
138. Id.
139. HORWITZ, supra note 54, at 35. Christopher Columbus Langdell has been identi-
fied as a "will theorist," and his will theory arguments are said to have been used "to craft
the classical bargain theory of consideration." Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforc-
ing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1263 n.15
(1980).
140. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation
and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 427, 428 (2000) ("[O]bjective approaches have
predominated in the common law of contracts since time immemorial.").
141. HORWITZ, supra note 54, at 37; see also Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 1, at
300 ("[A] theory that bases contractual obligation on the existence of a 'will to be bound' is
hard pressed to justify contractual obligation in the absence of an actual exercise of the
will. It is difficult to see why one is legally or morally committed to perform an agreement
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Thus, the will theory, although perhaps consistent with the objective the-
ory of contracts if one considers the manifestation of assent as the best
evidence of actual intent, 142 was inconsistent with a principle of contract
law that appeared to be based on policy.
The undermining of the will theory began with Oliver Wendell
Holmes's emphasis on the objective theory of contracts in The Common
Law in 1881143 and again with The Path of the Law in 1897.144 With the
publication of The Path of the Law, "objectivism [was] finally recognized
to be incompatible with a will theory of contracts."'1 45 In The Path of the
Law, "Holmes simply declared that when courts interpret or construe a
contract, they impose some social policy on the parties regardless of any
supposed intention."'1 46 Samuel Williston and Learned Hand further ad-
that one did not actually intend to commit oneself to and still hew to a theory that based
the commitment on its willful quality. This subjective component creates a tension be-
tween a will theory and the inescapable need of individuals in society and those trying to
administer a coherent legal system to rely on appearances-to rely on an individual's be-
havior that apparently manifests their assent to a transfer of entitlements.") (footnote
omitted). The inability of the will theory to explain quasi-contracts and implied-in-law
conditions also undermined the will theory, HORwITZ, supra note 54, at 37-39, as did the
contractual liability of a principal for an agent's actions, id. at 46-49, and the power of a
third party intended beneficiary to sue for breach. Id. at 50.
142. See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 1, at 272 (noting that the "will theorist"
view was that "[w]here we cannot discern the actual subjective intent or will of the parties,
there is no practical problem, since we assume it corresponds to objectively manifested
intentions.").
143. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1963) (1881).
144. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897).
145. HORWITZ, supra note 54, at 38. Holmes has been criticized for both arguing that
there could be no consistency in law, and yet attempting to adopt universal principles.
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 53 (1997). Holmes himself was a system
builder. As Mark DeWolfe Howe has noted, "[w]hen Holmes was twenty-nine he made it
clear that he was not satisfied with the old disorder of the law-that he would do what he
could to persuade his generation that an arrangement of the law and its concepts, 'scientifi-
cally' conceived, would bring in its wake not simply intellectual clarity but increased pro-
fessional competence." Mark DeWolfe Howe, Introduction, in HOLMES, supra note 143, at
xiii-xiv. Gilmore argues that Holmes "provided an apparently convincing demonstration
that it was possible, on a high level of intellectual discourse, to reduce all principles of
liability to a single, philosophically continuous series and to construct a unitary theory
which would explain all conceivable single instances and thus make it unnecessary to look
with any particularity at what was actually going on in the real world." GILMORE, supra, at
56. Holmes, of course, did not see the will theory as the organizing principle of contract
law. To the contrary, he was a strong advocate of the objective theory of contracts. Howe
asserts that this was part of a desire to keep German metaphysics-including Kantianism-
out of the law. Howe, supra, at xv. Holmes, however, could argue that there were no pre-
political natural rights that created a separation between law and politics, while at the same
time arguing that a legal system should be based on a few fundamental principles chosen
for policy reasons. Holmes's system building was thus somewhat different from Langdell's.
See Eric A. Posner, The Decline of Formality in Contract Law, in BUCKLEY, supra note 27,
at 64-65 ("Holmes's commitment to an axiomatic system of contract law comes perilously
close to Langdell's 'geometric' approach to contract law, but should not be confused with
it. A formal theory like Holmes's must be internally consistent, or else it will produce
indeterminate results. However, Holmes did not purport to derive his theory from self-
evident premises. Instead, he tried to present it as a unification of existing cases, which
themselves emerged from a long history of common law development in response to social
needs.").
146. HoRwrrz, supra note 54, at 38.
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vanced the objective theory of contracts, 147 and Arthur Corbin's pragma-
tism continued the task, 148 Corbin arguing that "all law was a reflection
of collective determination and thus inherently regulatory and
coercive.
149
But in 1981, Charles Fried, in his book Contract as Promise, sought to
resurrect the will theory, largely in response to the writings of Gilmore
and Atiyah. 150 Fried, seemingly a new natural law theorist,151 sought to
establish a unitary basis of contract law, 152 and the unifying structure was
a moral basis he called the "promise principle."' 153 Fried argued that in
private law (property, tort, and contract) liberal, individualistic premises
had taken root. 154 In this sense, Fried continued the public-private dis-
tinction championed by the earlier will theorists. 155 Fried argued that the
Kantian notion of respect for persons, not utilitarianism, 156 made a prom-
ise morally binding:
An individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he
has intentionally invoked a convention whose function it is to give
grounds-moral grounds-for another to expect the promised per-
formance. To renege is to abuse a confidence he was free to invite or
not, and which he intentionally did invite. To abuse that confidence
now is like (but only like) lying: the abuse of a shared social institu-
tion that is intended to invoke the bonds of trust. A liar and a prom-
ise-breaker each use another person. In both speech and promising
there is an invitation to the other to trust, to make himself vulnera-
ble; the liar and the promise-breaker then abuse that trust.157
Fried argued that the fact that promises were morally binding also in-
creased a person's autonomy because it permitted a person to choose to
147. GILMORE, supra note 34, at 43.
148. HORWITZ, supra note 54, at 49-50.
149. Id. at 50.
150. FRIED, supra note 21, Preface. Professor F.H. Buckley has noted that in the 1970s
"the principle of freedom of contract was everywhere in retreat" as a result of the writings
of Gilmore, Atiyah, and critical legal study scholars. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 1.
151. FRIED, supra note 21, at 100 (seemingly arguing in favor of natural law); see gener-
ally MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 15, at 36-51 (discussing the reemergence of natural
law theorists).
152. Fried's tone was overtly Langdellian. For example, Fried's first sentence is that
one of the book's purposes is "to show how a complex legal institution, contract, can be
traced to and is determined by a small number of basic moral principles" and to display its
"underlying structure." FRIED, supra note 21, Preface. He again stated that he hoped "to
show that the law of contract does have an underlying, unifying structure ... ." Id.
153. Id. at 1.
154. Id.
155. For a brief but useful discussion of the "public-private distinction," see BRIAN H.
Bix, A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL THEORY 173-74 (2004).
156. FRIED, supra note 21, at 16. Whether promises should be kept because they are
morally binding or because it promotes utility is an issue that has been debated signifi-
cantly between moralists and utilitarians. See WILL KYMLICKA: CONTEMPORARY POLITI-
CAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 22-25 (2002) (discussing competing views);
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 246 ("Indeed, even the most basic moral issue in this area-the
reason why there is a moral obligation to keep a promise-is still under active philosophi-
cal debate.").
157. FRIED, supra note 21, at 16 (footnote omitted).
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make her future conduct non-optional. 158
Of course, merely because there might be a moral obligation to keep a
promise does not mean Fried's promise principle is the basis of contract
law. Fried supported his argument by relying primarily on the expecta-
tion damages formula (which appears more consistent with the promise
principle than the reliance principle). 159
Fried, however, was faced with many contract doctrines-such as mis-
take, frustration of purpose, and impossibility-that did not appear
promissory-based. For these, he acknowledged they were based either on
tort or restitution principles, but argued that "contract as promise has a
distinct but neither exclusive nor necessarily dominant place among legal
and moral principles. '1 60 Fried argued that these were situations in which
contract law did not provide an answer, and as such other legal and moral
principles needed to be invoked,' 6 ' acknowledging that "the law itself
imposes contractual liability on the basis of a complex of moral, political,
and social judgments."' 62 But Fried ran into trouble with doctrines that
were clearly contract-law doctrines and that did not fit within the promise
principle-in particular, the rule that not all promises are legally en-
forced, and in general only promises given as part of a bargained-for ex-
change. Thus, Fried was left to simply argue that the consideration
requirement is incorrect 63 or that it served evidentiary purposes. 164
158. Id. at 14.
159. Id. at 17. But see Shiffrin, supra note 18, at 722-24 (arguing that the expectation
damages rule is inconsistent with the morality of promising because morally, a promisor is
required to perform as promised, not to pay an amount of money as a substitute).
160. FRIED, supra note 21, at 25; see also id. at 60 ("In all of these cases [dealing with
mistake, frustration, and impossibility] the court is forced to sort out the difficulties that
result when parties think they have agreed but actually have not. The one basis on which
these cases cannot be resolved is on the basis of the agreement-that is, of contract as
promise. The court cannot enforce the will of the parties because there are no concordant
wills. Judgment must therefore be based on principles external to the will of the parties.");
id. at 69 ("There is ... no ... necessity that a contract have a determinative answer to all
disputes that might arise relating to the contract's subject matter .... [W]hen relations
between parties are not governed by the actual promises they have made, they are gov-
erned by residual general principles of law."); id. at 81 ("In every mistake case, it is my
thesis, not promise but the competing equities must be used to resolve the inevitable di-
lemma caused by a contractual accident.").
161. Id. at 25.
162. Id. at 69.
163. See id. at 25 n.* (referring to "the artificial and unfortunate doctrine of considera-
tion."); id. at 35 ("I conclude that the standard doctrine of consideration ... does not pose
a challenge to my conception of contract law as rooted in promise, for the simple reason
that the doctrine is too internally inconsistent to offer an alternative at all."); id. at 37 ("I
conclude that the life of contract is indeed promise, but this conclusion is not exactly a
statement of positive law. There are too many gaps in the common law enforcement of
promises to permit so bold a statement. My conclusion is rather that the doctrine of con-
sideration offers no coherent alternative basis for the force of contracts, while still treating
promise as necessary to it."); Charles Fried, The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120
HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 6 n.18 (2007) ("Another place where morality points the way to the
reform of actual legal institutions is in respect to gratuitous promises that-if made with
sufficient seriousness and reflection-should be as enforceable as those supported by
consideration.").
164. See FRIED, supra note 21, at 42 ("[An exchange is necessary neither to promissory




Professor Randy A. Barnett, an apparent natural-law 65 libertarian 66
like Fried, has set forth what he calls a "consent theory" of contract. 167
Barnett sought to improve upon Fried's "contract as promise" theory
(which, to some, failed to adequately explain the objective theory of con-
tract formation), while at the same time maintaining an autonomy-based
theory168 that "eschews the sorts of substantive inquiries into and inter-
ference with ordinary contractual arrangements that substance-based the-
ories demand."' 69 Barnett builds off of the idea that contract law
addresses how rights are transferred or alienated between rights hold-
ers170 and sees contract law's purpose as protecting against the wrongful
interference with such transfers and bringing resource distribution into
conformity with parties' entitlements derived from such transfers. 171
Under Barnett's theory, contractual obligation is based on a person's
consent to transfer an entitlement. 72 For Barnett, "consent" is different
from "will," in that "consent" (according to Barnett) refers not only to
subjective intent, but to an "interrelational act."' 173 Barnett argues that
"[t]he consent that is required is [thus] a manifestation of an intention to
alienate rights. ' 174 In this respect, Barnett's theory expanded contractual
obligation beyond what it would be under the will theory, and it also cor-
rected the deficiency of the will theory by explaining the objective theory
of formation.175
complishes is to supply some other truly necessary element. Perhaps this is why it has
seemed so natural to insist on consideration. The fact that I pay for a promise establishes
two things: that the promise was made to me, and that I desired the promise to be made.").
Professor Bix has asserted that Fried "presented his theory as much as an argument for
reforming current doctrine as an explanation of or justification for existing law." Bix,
supra note 21, at 9 n.23.
165. Barnett considers a "valid legal obligation" to be "an obligation that it is morally
appropriate to enforce," in contrast to a legal obligation "which a particular legal system
will enforce (whether or not it should) ...." Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 1, at 296
n.111; see also id. at 297 n.115 ("The fact that society does not recognize a right cannot
alone mean that morally such a right does not exist.").
166. See John M. Breen, Neutrality in Liberal Legal Theory and Catholic Social
Thought, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 513, 518 n.16 (2009) (identifying Barnett as a
libertarian).
167. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 1, at 291-321.
168. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 233 (identifying Barnett as providing an autonomy-
based theory). Barnett's theory is also a better fit with the general enforceability of form
contracts. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 627 (2002) (explaining consistency between the consent theory of contract and the
general enforceability of form contracts).
169. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 1, at 320.
170. Id. at 292.
171. Id. at 296.
172. Id. at 299.
173. Id. at 299 n.121.
174. Id. at 304 (emphasis added).
175. Professor Melvin A. Eisenberg has asserted that Barnett is only able to do this by
employing a definition of "consent" that varies from its normal meaning. Eisenberg, supra
note 1, at 233. Eisenberg argues that "[c]onsent is a subjective, not an objective, concept.
When we say that a person has consented to something, we do not mean that he gave the
appearance of consenting; we mean he actually consented. Barnett's theory therefore does
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Barnett defended the objective approach based on the protection of
the promisee's rights and the needs of the legal system. According to
Barnett, "a vital function of a system of well-defined entitlements is the
avoidance of disputes. ' 176 Therefore, "an entitlements theory demands
that the boundaries of protected domains be ascertainable, not only by
judges who must resolve disputes that have arisen, but, perhaps more im-
portantly, by the affected persons themselves before any dispute oc-
curs."' 177 And to Barnett, "[a] coherent rights theory will . . . allocate
rights largely on the basis of factors that minimize the likelihood of gen-
erating conflicting claims. In this regard, objectively manifested conduct,
which usually reflects subjective intent, provides a far sounder basis for
contractual obligation than do subjectively held intentions.' '178 Barnett
asserts that an objective standard is morally justified because such an ap-
proach "respect[s] and protect[s] the rights and liberty interests of others,
whose plans and expectations would be severely limited if they were not
entitled to rely on things as they appear to be and to take the assertive
conduct of others at face value."'1 79 According to Barnett, the objective
theory helps establish "the clear boundaries required by an entitlements
approach.'180
Although Barnett's consent theory expanded contractual liability be-
yond what it would be under the will theory, the contractual obligation
under Barnett's consent theory was in one respect narrower than contrac-
tual obligation under the will theory. According to Barnett, a "manifesta-
tion of an intention to alienate rights" also "implies that one intends to be
legally bound" and this is "what a court should seek to find before hold-
ing that a contractual obligation has been created."' 8 ' Thus, for Barnett,
a "promise" is not enough to create legal liability.182 A promise might
create a moral obligation to perform, but to create a contractual obliga-
tion something more is needed, and for Barnett, it is the manifestation of
an intention to be legally bound.183
Barnett, however, like Fried, ran into trouble with respect to the gen-
eral rule that a promise or consent to a transfer is not itself sufficient to
be legally binding. Barnett, recognizing this problem, argued that the
consideration requirement played an evidentiary role: "The fact that a
person had received something of value in return for a 'promise' may
indeed indicate that this promise was an expression of intention to trans-
fer rights."'1 84 Also, "the receipt of a benefit in return for a promise
not resolve the dilemma any more than does Fried's, because his 'consent' theory does not
require actual consent, or more accurately, requires no consent at all." Id.
176. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 1, at 301.
177. Id. at 302.
178. Id. at 303-04.
179. Id. at 306.
180. Id. at 307.
181. Id. at 304.
182. Id. at 305.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 313.
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should serve as objective notice to the promisor that the promise has
been interpreted by the other party to be legally binding. ' 185 Barnett
conceded, however, that under a consent theory of contract, "the absence
of either bargained-for consideration or reliance will not bar the enforce-
ment of a transfer of entitlements that can be proved in some other
way-for example, by a formal written document or by adequate proof of
a sufficiently unambiguous verbal commitment."' 86 Thus, Barnett was ul-
timately left to state that "[a] consent theory . ..provides a focus for
contemporary dissatisfaction with the doctrine of consideration."'1 87 So
Barnett's autonomy-based theory had improved upon an important defi-
ciency in Fried's promise principle, but it failed to improve upon another.
4. Bargain Theory
Grant Gilmore described a Holmes-Williston contract theory of the
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, which he referred to
as "the classical or general theory of contract. ' 188 According to Gilmore,
the theory started with Langdell promoting the idea that there "really is
such a thing as the one true rule of law, universal and unchanging, always
and everywhere the same-a sort of mystical absolute.' 89 Then, Lang-
dell selected contract law as the area of law for developing a general the-
ory of law.190 According to Gilmore, the general outlines of the theory of
contract were then supplied by Holmes.191 Although "Holmes kept his
own theories open-ended by his reiterated insistence that law basically
reflects social and economic conditions and must change as they change,"
Samuel Williston (according to Gilmore) in turn implemented Holmes's
ideas in a "thoroughly Langdellian spirit."'1 92
Gilmore maintained that the theory was based on the notion that it
should be difficult to establish the existence of a contract, but once one
was established, liability for non-performance should be absolute. 193 Ac-
185. Id.
186. Id. at 317.
187. Id. at 319.
188. GILMORE, supra note 34, at 94.
189. Id. at 97-98.
190. Id. at 98.
191. Id. at 14.
192. Id. at 98 n.256.
193. Whether Holmes and Williston in fact had a "theory of contract" is disputed. Pro-
fessor Peter Benson, for example, has argued that their work was untheoretical. Rather,
they (and others) simply sought to "bring order and internal consistency to the law of
contract." Benson, Introduction, supra note 17, at 2. He maintains that "these jurists did
not so much develop a theory as systematically present the legal point of view by clarifying
the definitions of contract principles and doctrines and by exploring, within limits, their
implications and their conceptual interconnections." Id. at 2 n.4; see also Farnsworth,
supra note 18, at 208 (maintaining that Williston did not consider himself as having a the-
ory of contract law). James Gordley has also identified significant differences between
Holmes and Williston regarding their views on contract law. James R. Gordley, Book
Note, The Death of Contract, 89 HARV. L. REV. 452, 456-57 (1975). For an argument that
Williston's work was more pragmatic than commonly thought, see Mark. L. Movsesian,
Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 213-14 (2005).
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cording to Gilmore, some of the hallmarks of the theory were the re-
quirements of a bargained-for exchange to render a promise
enforceable1 94 and the application of the objective theory of formation
and interpretation. 95 The effect of a general theory of contract grounded
on the need for a bargained-for exchange to make a promise enforceable
meant that all sorts of promises-interfamily promises, promises to mod-
ify a contract or forgive a debt, promises to keep an offer open-would
be denied enforcement unless made as part of a bargain.' 96 The idea that
consideration should be limited to a bargained-for exchange was designed
to limit the number of promises that were enforceable. 197
The "bargain theory" of contract has been described as a "process
based" theory that "shift[s] the focus of the inquiry from the contracting
parties and from the substance of the parties' agreement to the manner in
which the parties reached their agreement."' 98 But as has been noted
about procedural theories, "[t]he mere fact that someone has observed a
particular procedure in agreeing to do something does not explain why he
should be required to abide by the terms of his agreement; to explain why
he should, an appeal must be made to something other than the proce-
dure itself."' 99
Scholars have, therefore, sought to ferret out an underlying moral the-
ory to the bargain theory of contract. For example, Gilmore argued that
although the builders of the general theory of contract in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries were perhaps not motivated by lais-
sez-faire economic theory, their theory-with limited liability-was
consistent with nineteenth-century individualism and laissez-faire eco-
nomic theory (which Gilmore described as everyone being able to do an-
ything they wanted)-and "responded to the felt needs of the time.' '2°°
Gilmore argued that:
A system in which everybody is invited to do his own thing, at
whatever cost to his neighbor, must work ultimately to the benefit of
the rich and powerful, who are in a position to look after themselves
and to act, so to say, as their own self-insurers. As we look back on
the nineteenth century theories, we are struck most of all, I think, by
the narrow scope of social duty which they impliedly assumed. No
man is his brother's keeper; the race is to the swift; let the devil take
194. GILMORE, supra note 34, at 18.
195. Id. at 35.
196. Id. at 21-34; see also Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 1, at 310 (noting that
"the ascendancy of the bargain theory of consideration . .. had the unintended conse-
quence of creating doctrinal problems for the enforcement of formal commitments where
there was no bargained-for consideration.").
197. GILMORE, supra note 34, at 21.
198. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 1, at 287.
199. Kronman, supra note 29, at 477.
200. GILMORE, supra note 34, at 95. Gilmore also argued that part of the basis for the
theory was distrust of the jury, id. at 99, and that the consideration rule and objective






Law and economics scholars argue that "[e]conomic activity revolves
around mutually beneficial trade, and the principal purpose of contract
law is to facilitate such trade. '202 "The initial aim of law and economics
scholarship was to test the hypothesis that economic principles lend order
and structure to the common law of contracts. '20 3 To such scholars, "con-
tract doctrines [might] reflect judicial efforts, whether deliberate or un-
conscious, to achieve efficiency."
'204
For these scholars, efficiency means contract doctrines that help move
resources toward their most valuable uses. 205 When parties voluntarily
exchange goods or services for money and the exchange makes each of
them better off, "the exchange will also increase the wealth of the society
(of which they are members), assuming the exchange does not reduce the
welfare of nonparties more than it increases A's and B's welfare. '20 6 Law
and economics and efficiency theories are, therefore, considered to be
grounded in utilitarianism.20 7
Law and economics scholars generally prefer a system that freely per-
mits voluntary exchange. 20 8 They also prefer a system under which losses
are internalized by the party that can take precautions against the loss at
the cheapest price;209 transaction costs are reduced (which includes pre-
contract negotiations, administering the contract, and enforcing the con-
201. Id. at 95.
202. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW ix (2007).
203. Id. at xix.
204. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT
LAW 1 (1979); see also Bix, supra note 155, at 115 ("Particularly at its earliest stages of
development, there was... a 'descriptive' or 'positive' side to law and economics, in which
some theorists tried to argue that most common-law rules were efficient (in different
terms, that they maximized social wealth). Economic efficiency was proposed as the con-
scious or unconscious goal of the judges who developed the common law doctrines in vari-
ous private law areas."); MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 15, at 181-82 ("The work in law
and economics has had both analytic and normative dimensions. The analytic work has
aimed at demonstrating that large areas of law could be explained by seeing them as con-
cerned not so much with matters of justice but with the efficient allocation of resources.
The normative work in the field is concerned to give legislators and judges a framework for
legislating and adjudicating cases so as to promote the goal of efficiency.").
205. See KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 204, at 1-2 ("The fundamental economic
principle with which we begin is that if voluntary exchanges are permitted-if, in other
words, a market is allowed to operate-resources will gravitate toward their most valuable
uses.").
206. Id. at 2.
207. See SMITH, supra note 24, at 108 (identifying efficiency theories as based on utilita-
rianism); Bix, supra note 155, at 214 ("Economic analysis-and its legal analogue, law and
economics-can be seen to be grounded on a variant of utilitarianism .... "); LARRY A.
DIMATTEO, ET AL., VISIONS OF CONTRACT THEORY: RATIONALITY, BARGAINING, AND IN-
TERPRETATION 15, 15 n.7 (2007) (noting that a law and economics approach-the goal of
which "is to advance economic efficiency by properly shaping legal doctrine"-"[a]s ap-
plied to contract law ... is obviously a utilitarian approach.").




tract-including negotiations after breach);210 and the parties have access
to relevant information at a minimum cost.211
According to law and economics scholars, contract law promotes a sys-
tem of voluntary exchange in several ways. First, by enforcing contracts
(i.e., imposing formal sanctions against a party who breaches) contract
law encourages parties to enter into contracts under which one party's
performance will take a period of time.212 If such sanctions were not
available, a party whose performance was to occur second might not have
an incentive to perform after receiving the first party's performance.
Without the law providing a sanction for a party receiving the considera-
tion and then not completing performance, "people would be reluctant to
enter into contracts and the process of economic exchange would be re-
tarded. '21 3 This also encourages a party to rely on a promise. 21 4 To ob-
tain these benefits, contracts must be reliably enforced. 215 Second,
contract law provides so-called "default rules" 216 that parties need not
spend time and money negotiating about (thereby reducing the transac-
tion costs associated with contracting). 217
Law and economic scholars assert that efficiency concerns can account
for the rules regarding formation (the objective theory of contract forma-
tion) 218 and remedies (the expectation damages rule). 219 Although an
economist would only consider as value-maximizing a contract formed
under the subjective theory of contract formation, the objective theory
deters contracting parties from engaging in careless behavior during the
contract process, and thus discourages "a costly form of carelessness that
would tend to impede [the contracting process]. '220 An award of expec-
tation damages "force[s] those who make promises to internalize the
costs the breach imposes on the other party. Someone who makes a
promise in an expectation damage regime has no incentive to break the
promise unless he has better opportunities. 221 If damages were less than
protecting the promisee's expectation interest, the breaching party would
have an incentive to breach even when performance provided a net bene-
fit.222 Also, under the idea of "efficient breach," the law should not
award more than expectation damages (i.e., no punitive damages) be-
cause this would create a disincentive for breaches that would result in a
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 4.
213. KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 204, at 4.
214. BAIRD, supra note 202, at ix.
215. Id.
216. "Default rules" are "provisions the law supplies to deal with conditions and cir-
cumstances about which the contract says nothing." Id. at x.
217. Id.
218. KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 204, at 5.
219. See POLINSKY, supra note 45, at 35 ("[Tjhe expectation remedy is the only remedy
that creates efficient incentives with respect to breaches of contracts.").
220. KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 204, at 5.
221. BAIRD, supra note 202, at xii.




Because law and economics scholars desire a system that promotes free
exchange, their goal is not very different from that of the "contract as
promise" theorists, with each, for example, agreeing that expectation
damages is the proper measure of damages. 224 But a law and economics
approach, which is consequentialist, only values individual autonomy
indirectly.22 5
6. Substantive Fairness Theory
Professor Randy Barnett has identified a theory of contractual obliga-
tion that he calls the "fairness theory. '226 According to Barnett, this
"school of thought attempts to evaluate the substance of a transaction to
see if it is 'fair." 227 For example, Professor Morton Horwitz has argued
that in the eighteenth century, contractual obligation was limited based
on the fairness of the exchange.228 Thus, according to Horwitz, "[c]ourts
and juries did not honor business agreements on their face, but scruti-
nized them for the substantive equality of the exchange. ' 229 He argues
that this limitation was implemented through (1) the doctrine that "eq-
uity courts would refuse specific.., performance of any contract in which
they determined that the consideration was inadequate"; 230 (2) "a sub-
stantive doctrine of consideration which allowed the jury to take into ac-
count not only whether there was consideration, but also whether it was
adequate, before awarding damages"; 231 (3) the courts' failure to instruct
juries on determining the amount of damages and the courts' failure to
reverse damage judgments, which resulted in "the community's sense of
fairness" dictating the result in contracts cases;232 and (4) the enforce-
223. Id. Such a notion is at odds with Fried's notion of contract as promise. Id. at xix
n.10.
224. FRIED, supra note 21, at 17; POLINSKY, supra note 45, at 35.
225. See Kronman, supra note 29, at 486 ("Any principle, such as utilitarianism, that
purports to evaluate states of affairs solely on the basis of the total amount of some good
they happen to contain is capable of taking the idea of autonomy into account only indi-
rectly; utilitarianism can give weight to the independence of individuals only insofar as
their independence contributes to something else which is taken to be good in itself.").
226. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 1, at 269; see also Richard E. Speidel, Book
Note, Changing Your Mind: The Law of Regretted Decisions By E. Allen Farnsworth, 31
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 255, 258 (2000) (discussing the "Fairness themes" in contract).
227. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 1, at 283.
228. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 164 (1977)
("The most important aspect of the eighteenth century conception of exchange is an equi-
table limitation on contractual obligation. Under the modern will theory, the extent of
contractual obligation depends on the convergence of individual desires. The equitable
theory, by contrast, limited and sometimes denied contractual obligation by reference to
the fairness of the underlying exchange."). But see A.W. Brian Simpson, The Horwitz
Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1979) (disputing Horwitz's
argument).
229. HORWITZ, supra note 228, at 167.
230. Id. at 164.
231. Id. at 165.
232. Id. at 166.
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ment of a rule that "a sound price warrants a sound commodity."233
More recently, the use of the unconscionability doctrine to defeat en-
forcement is an example of using notions of fairness.234 Additionally,
Professor Anthony Kronman argues that "rules of contract law should be
used to implement distributional goals whenever alternative ways of do-
ing so are likely to be more costly or intrusive."235 Kronman argues "that
considerations of distributive justice not only ought to be taken into ac-
count in designing rules for exchange, but must be taken into account if
the law of contracts is to have even minimum moral acceptability. '236
But Kronman, to support his argument, is required to expand the gener-
ally accepted concept of "contract law" to include statutes with respect to
usury, minimum wage, rent control, and racial discrimination in employ-
ment and the sale of real estate.237
7. Synthesis or Multi-Value Theory (Neoclassical Contract Law)
In response to so-called unitary theories of contract law, various schol-
ars have argued that no single principle can explain contract law, and that
contract law is based on a synthesis of principles. For example, Professor
Joseph Perillo has asserted that "[i]t cannot be said that any of the com-
peting philosophical premises.., is officially enshrined in our law of con-
tract. Each of them, together with the pervasive desire of the law to
prevent unjust enrichment, coexists as part of our frequently utilized
stock of legally acceptable arguments. ' 238 Professor Eisenberg, making a
normative argument, has asserted that contract rules should take into ac-
count "all relevant moral, policy, and empirical propositions. '239
Professor Jay Feinman has referred to modern contract law as "neo-
classical contract law."'240 The description is based on the idea that mod-
ern contract law is based on classical contract law, but with subsequent
critiques absorbed into it.241 Feinman notes that "[n]eoclassical contract
can be described as anti-theoretical and multi-dimensional. '242 Neoclas-
sical contract law, incorporating the criticisms of classical contract law
without completely abandoning it, "attempts to balance the individualist
ideals of classical contract with communal standards of responsibility to
233. Id. at 167.
234. Id.
235. Kronman, supra note 29, at 474.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 507.
238. PERILLO, supra note 1, at 9.
239. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 241; see also JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL
ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1991) (proposing a pluralist theory); Robert
A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REV. 103 (1988) (similarly
proposing a pluralist theory); Robert Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96
HARV. L. REV. 561, 616-48 (1983) (arguing that none of the proposed theories can account
for the entirety of contract law).
240. Feinman, supra note 60, at 1285.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1295.
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others. '2 43 Thus, "[t]he core remains the principle of freedom of contract
* . .but this principle is 'tempered both within and without [contract's]
formal structure by principles, such as reliance and unjust enrichment,
that focus on fairness and the interdependence of parties rather than on
parties' actual agreements.'"244
III. EMPLOYEE COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
A. BACKGROUND
Employee covenants not to compete are commonplace. 245 These con-
tracts involve a promise by an employee to his or her current or prospec-
tive employer to not compete against the employer after the employment
relationship ends. 246 The purpose of such a covenant is usually to prevent
unfair competition through the former employee's use of relationships or
information that the employee acquired during and as part of the former
employment relationship. 247 Such agreements are necessary for employ-
243. Id. at 1287-88.
244. Id. at 1288 (quoting Hillman, supra note 239, at 104).
245. See Estlund, supra note 13, at 381 (recognizing that employee non-compete agree-
ments are "increasingly common"); Thomas M. Hogan, Note, Uncertainty in the Employ-
ment Context: Which Types of Restrictive Covenants are Enforceable?, 80 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 429, 429 (2006) ("Restrictive covenants have become a classic condition of employ-
ment, as employers feel the need to protect business interests."); Turner, supra note 5, at 43
("Fierce economic competition and a highly mobile workforce have caused many employ-
ers to require, with unprecedented frequency, that their new hires and existing employees
execute non-compete agreements."); Phillip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary
Nonservitude: The Current Judicial Enforcement of Employee Covenants Not to Compete-
A Proposal for Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 531, 532 (1984) ("Because of the increasing
emphasis in the American economy on technically skilled employees and service oriented
businesses, the covenant not to compete has become a standard addition to employment
contracts."); Margaret N. Kniffin, Employee Noncompetition Covenants: The Perils of Per-
forming Unique Services, 10 RUTGERS L.J. 25, 25 (1978) ("In many employment contracts,
the employee covenants that, after termination of employment, he will not compete with
his former employer.").
246. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625,
625 n.1 (1960); see also Closius & Schaffer, supra note 245, at 531 ("A covenant not to
compete is a contractual restriction upon an individual's ability to compete with another
person or entity following the termination of some transaction or relationship between the
two."); James R. Krendl & Cathy S. Krendl, Noncompetition Covenants in Colorado: A
Statutory Solution?, 52 DEN. L.J. 499, 499 (1975) ("Noncompetition covenants are agree-
ments whereby one party, the covenantor, agrees not to compete with another party, the
covenantee, in a particular line of business for a specified period of time and in a specified
area."); Chiara F. Orsini, Comment, Protecting an Employer's Human Capital: Covenants
Not to Compete and the Changing Business Environment, 62 U. Prrr. L. REV. 175, 176
(2000) ("These agreements often provide that 'after the termination of employment for
any reason, the employee will not compete with the employer in the employer's existing or
contemplated businesses for a designated period of time' and within a designated geo-
graphic area.") (quoting Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 575, 602-03 (1999)).
247. Blake, supra note 246, at 647. Some courts, however, have enforced non-compete
agreements based on the unique talents of the employee. See Kniffin, supra note 245.
Professor Kniffin recognized that this rationale is different from the traditional rationale
for enforcing a non-compete agreement. See id. at 55 ("Trade secrets and customer rela-
tionships are, in a sense, property of the employer, and it is reasonable to prevent the
departing employee from absconding with them. But uniqueness is, by its very nature, a
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ers because an employee's "fiduciary obligations become less stringent
[after termination of employment] and the agent is free to compete with
the former principal. '2 48
An employee's non-compete pledge is usually found in a stand-alone
non-compete contract or as a provision in an employment contract.249
The extent of the non-compete pledge in a particular contract varies with
respect to geographic scope, temporal scope, and line of business. Em-
ployees often sign such contracts because they lack the bargaining power
to obtain the job without signing the agreement, and such contracts are
often contracts of adhesion.250
Most cases involving employee non-compete agreements are between
the former employer who is seeking to enforce the non-compete pledge
and the employee who has allegedly breached the contract. 251 The en-
forceability of a non-compete pledge is not determined solely by tradi-
tional contract doctrine. 252 Rather, because such agreements are
considered in restraint of trade,2 53 they are enforced only if (in addition
to satisfying the traditional requirements of contractual liability) the re-
straint is considered "reasonable."2 5 4 Also, "[p]ost-employment re-
straints are scrutinized with particular care because they are often the
product of unequal bargaining power and because the employee is likely
to give scant attention to the hardship he may later suffer through loss of
possession of the employee himself. He may have acquired his extraordinary skills under
the guidance of the employer, or he may have been born with them, or at least have
brought them to his job. But the nature of the services he renders is inherently dependent
upon his own person. And since the employee's person cannot be considered the property
of the employer, it is questionable whether an employer should be able to exercise domin-
ion over the use of these unique abilities.").
248. Closius & Schaffer, supra note 245, at 534. A duty not to compete against one's
employer during the term of employment "will be implied from general agency principles."
Blake, supra note 246, at 647 n.74; see also Closius & Schaffer, supra note 245, at 533
("During the agency relationship, the agent has 'a duty not to compete with the principal
concerning the subject matter of his agency."') (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 393 (1957)). An employer can bring a claim in either tort or contract for an
employee's breach of the duty of loyalty. Eckard Brandes, Inc. v. Riley, 338 F.3d 1082,
1086 (9th Cir. 2003).
249. Blake, supra note 246, at 625 n.1.
250. Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10
J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 100 (1981).
251. Id. The other common scenario is a former employee filing a declaratory judg-
ment action against the employer to determine if the non-compete pledge is enforceable.
Filing such a suit might provide the employer with the advantage of selecting the forum for
the lawsuit. See Turner, supra note 5, at 46 ("One strategy available to an employee faced
with the potential of being sued for violating a non-compete is to take the offensive imme-
diately. Tactically, the employee attempts to turn the tables on the employer in order to
gain the advantage. Therefore, an employee who may be faced with the threat of immi-
nent litigation through the filing of an injunction for alleged breach of a non-compete may
wish to consider a preemptive strike - the filing of a declaratory judgment action - which
should seek a determination of the enforceability of the non-compete agreement and a
declaration of its invalidity.").
252. See ATTYAH, RiSE AND FALL, supra note 88, at 451 (noting that such cases have
"always been subject to special rules.").
253. See Closius & Schaffer, supra note 245, at 539 ("The legality of any covenant not to
compete is initially suspect as a restraint of trade.").
254. Estlund, supra note 13, at 393.
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his livelihood. ' 255 In this respect, employee covenants not to compete
are strictly scrutinized to protect the interest of both the public (with re-
spect to the benefits of competition) and the employee.2 56
Usually, the primary issues involved in cases seeking to enforce such
covenants are whether the covenant is supported by a so-called "protect-
able interest" or "legitimate business interest"257 and whether the area,
time, and line of business restrictions are reasonable. But many of these
cases also involve different kinds of defenses, such as whether the em-
ployer breached the employment contract first, thereby discharging the
employee's duties under the covenant not to compete and whether equi-
table doctrines preclude an injunction against the continued breach of the
agreement.
B. EARLY ENGLISH COMMON LAW
Under early English common law, employee covenants not to compete
were invalid irrespective of their reasonableness.25 8 There were several
reasons for this position. First, "[i]t was then believed that every member
of society had his appropriate estate or degree which God had ordained
for him, and that it was his duty to serve God in the estate or degree in
which he found himself. '259 And even if a restraint was limited to a par-
ticular geographic area, the guild system made it difficult for persons to
find work in other areas.2 60 Second, such agreements conflicted with the
traditional rules of apprenticeship. 261 Generally, an apprentice was re-
quired to serve a long apprenticeship period during which the master paid
the apprentice small or no wages, and the quid pro quo was that at the
end of this period the apprentice, now a journeyman, would be able to
255. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. g (1981).
256. Estlund, supra note 13, at 396.
257. See Closius & Schaffer, supra note 245, at 541 ("Balancing these competing poli-
cies has led modern courts to scrutinize covenants not to compete by stating, first, that any
such covenant, ancillary to an agency relationship, is unenforceable unless it protects some
legitimate interest of the principal.").
258. Blake, supra note 246, at 631-32; see also Hogan, supra note 245, at 433 (noting
that "English courts were initially hostile towards enforcement because these restrictions
tended to disadvantage powerless artisans."). Some commentators have argued that under
early English common law all contracts in restraint of trade were void. See Gary P. Krei-
der, Trends in the Enforcement of Restrictive Employment Contracts, 35 U. CIN. L. REV. 16,
16 (1966) ("Originally, at common law, all contracts in restraint of trade were held void.");
Kniffin, supra note 245, at 27 ("The earliest recorded cases concerning noncompetition
covenants indicate that it was unnecessary for the courts to assess reasonableness; it was
generally held that any contract prohibiting competition was void as a restraint of trade.").
The first reported case dealing with a covenant not to compete is apparently John Dyer's
Case, 2 Hen. V, f. 5, pl. 26 (1414), in which the judge stated: "In my opinion, [the defen-
dant] could have demurred on it, that the obligation is void, because the condition is con-
trary to the common law, and by God if the plaintiff were here, he would go to prison until
he had made an end [i.e., paid a fine] with the King." Id. (quoted in A. W. BRIAN SIMP-
SON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACTr: THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF As-
SuMPSIT 519 (1975)).
259. SIMPSON, supra note 258, at 519.
260. Id. at 521.
261. Blake, supra note 246, at 632.
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practice his trade.262 In fact, an English statute in 1536 made non-compe-
tition agreements with respect to apprentices illegal. 263 As has been
noted by Professor A.W. Brian Simpson, "[w]e are concerned with a pe-
riod where the move from status to contract has not progressed far. ''264
C. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND THE RISE OF THE
"REASONABLENESS" TEST
In the early seventeenth century, courts in England started to relax the
rule that all contracts in restraint of trade were invalid. 265 And by the
early nineteenth century the apprenticeship system was gone, and con-
tracts designed to replace that system were becoming more common. 266
During the nineteenth century, courts hearing employee covenant not to
compete cases followed the approach adopted in 1711 by the Queen's
Bench in Mitchel v. Reynolds.267
Mitchel arose out of a covenant not to compete ancillary to the sale of a
business.268 The case involved a defendant who assigned to the plaintiff a
lease for a bake shop.269 The defendant promised that he would not en-
gage in the profession of baking in a specified area, but he then breached
the contract. 270 The plaintiff sued, and the defendant argued that the
promise was an illegal restraint of trade. 271 Lord Macclesfield stated that
there is a presumption that any restraint of trade is invalid because such
agreements might cause hardship on the covenantor resulting from an
inability to earn a livelihood, cause harm to society from losing the cove-
nantor's services, and enable a business to develop a monopoly.2 72 The
court, however, found that the restraint in the case was enforceable. 273
The court held that it was reasonable for the parties to enter into the non-
compete agreement because it was ancillary to the sale of a business, and
if it were not enforced, it would result in hardship to a businessperson
who wanted to retire but could not obtain an acceptable price because
the buyer could not be assured the seller would not compete against the
buyer.274
But the court warned that the situation might be different with respect
to an employee covenant not to compete. 275 The court noted that such
262. Id. at 633.
263. Id. at 634.
264. SIMPSON, supra note 258, at 521.
265. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 88, at 126.
266. Blake, supra note 246, at 638.
267. Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). The Mitchel
decision was essentially a systemization of seventeenth century cases that had begun to
enforce various non-compete agreements. SIMPSON, supra note 258, at 524.




272. Id. at 187.
273. Id. at 197.
274. Id. at 191.
275. Id. at 189.
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agreements are subject to "great abuses ... from masters, who are apt to
give their apprentices much vexation on this account, and to use many
indirect practices to procure such bonds from them, lest they should
prejudice them in their custom, when they come up to set up for them-
selves. '276 The court also noted that there is a distinction between a
"general" restraint and a "particular" or "partial" restraint.2 77 A "gen-
eral" restraint would be one that extends throughout the entire country
and was perhaps unlimited in time.278 A "particular" restraint was one
limited in area and perhaps limited to doing business with particular per-
sons.279 The court noted that a "general" restraint would never be up-
held because it would be unreasonable.280
Although Mitchel involved a restraint as part of the sale of a business,
during the nineteenth century, its "reasonableness" approach to restraint
of trade cases was considered the relevant authority for employee-re-
straint cases,281 and the development of employee non-compete law in
276. Id. at 190.




281. Blake, supra note 246, at 638-39; see also Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge:
Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual
Property, 1800-1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 455 (2001) ("Mitchel established a mul-
tifactored analysis of reasonableness that has ever since dominated the law's approach to
contractual restraints on the practice of a trade and thus to the dissemination of workplace
knowledge."). Hogan, supra note 245, at 433 ("Mitchel provided the framework, which
exists today in the American judicial system, for determining whether a restrictive cove-
nant is reasonable under the circumstances to warrant enforcement."). Interestingly,
though, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, almost all employee covenants not
to compete were upheld in England. Blake, supra note 246, at 640. This was due to several
factors. First, in 1853 the Court of Queen's Bench reversed the rule that restraints of trade
are prima facie invalid and placed the burden on the covenantor to prove that the covenant
was unreasonable. Id. Second, some English courts mistakenly believed that the reasona-
bleness doctrine had been abandoned in an 1837 decision. Id. Third, it was a period of
intense competition, and thus restraints of trade were not perceived as particularly harm-
ful. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 88, at 410. Fourth, it was an era that emphasized
freedom of contract, Blake, supra note 246, at 640-41, and "[t]he rule of reason during the
period derived much of its content from the predominant importance accorded freedom-
of-contract ideas." Id. at 643; see also ATrYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 88, at 697 ("By
the 1870s the judges were so accustomed to the idea that all contracts should in principle
be enforceable, at least in the absence of plain illegality or sexual immorality, that even the
old common law hostility to agreements in restraint of trade had been seriously weak-
ened."). In fact, courts began upholding what the court in Mitchel referred to as "general"
restraints. Blake, supra note 246, at 641. "[A]s technology advanced, the general-partial
distinction became meaningless, and thus unreasonable, and was narrowly applied and fi-
nally abandoned." Id. at 639. Thus, "[t]he reasonableness test was always employed, but
the values it embodied during the era were such that almost any restraint no larger than
the market in which the covenantee did business was held suitable." Id. at 642. It was not
until decisions in 1913 and 1916 by the House of Lords that English courts took "a more
active role in protecting the employee from undue burdens" of covenants not to compete.
Id. at 643. The decisions did four things. First, they established that "the rule of reason
required different measures to be applied in employee-restraint cases." Id. Second, the
burden was placed on the employer to prove that the restraint is reasonable. Id. Third,
when determining whether the restraint was reasonable the employee's interests must be
considered. Id. Fourth, a restraint was unreasonable if its only purpose was to protect the
employer from competition. Id.
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the United States was similar to that in England.282 By the late nine-
teenth century, the "reasonableness" standard for enforcing an employee
covenant not to compete was accepted. 283
D. MODERN LAW REGARDING EMPLOYEE COVENANTS
NOT TO COMPETE
The modern law continues to enforce an employee covenant not to
compete if it is considered a "reasonable" restraint of trade. Thus, while
the First Restatement of Contracts in 1932 provided that "[a] bargain is in
restraint of trade when its performance would limit competition in any
business or restrict a promisor in the exercise of a gainful occupation, 28 4
it also adopted the "rule of reason," providing that "[a] bargain in re-
straint of trade is illegal if the restraint is unreasonable. '285
The First Restatement provided that:
[a] restraint of trade is unreasonable, in the absence of statutory au-
thorization or dominant social or economic justification, if it (a) is
greater than is required for the protection of the person for whose
benefit the restraint is imposed, or (b) imposes undue hardship upon
the person restricted, or... (e) is based on a promise to refrain from
competition and is not ancillary either to a contract for the transfer
of good-will or other subject of property or to an existing employ-
ment or contract of employment. 286
The comments further provided that:
[n]either the period of time during which a restraint is to last, nor the
extent of the territory that is to be included is conclusive but the
length of time and even more the extent of space are important fac-
tors in the determination of the reasonableness of a restrictive
agreement.287
The First Restatement also provided that the following would not im-
pose an unreasonable restraint of trade unless it effected a monopoly:
A bargain by an assistant, servant, or agent not to compete with his
employer, or principal, during the term of the employment agency,
or thereafter, within such territory and during such time as may be
reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer or principal,
without imposing undue hardship on the employee or agent. 288
But the comments cautioned that:
[a] promise of a former employee will not ordinarily be enforced so
as to preclude him from exercising skill and knowledge acquired in
282. Id.
283. Id. at 644.
284. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 513 (1932).
285. Id. § 514; see also Kreider, supra note 258, at 17 ("American courts have upheld
contracts restricting future employment so long as the limitations they imposed were rea-
sonable and not injurious to the public.") (footnotes omitted).
286. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CoNTRAcrs § 515 (1932).
287. Id. § 515 cmt. c.
288. Id. § 516(f).
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his employer's business, even if the competition is injurious to the
latter, except so far as to prevent the use of trade secrets or lists of
customers, or unless the services of the employee are of a unique
character. 289
The First Restatement test has been summarized as providing that "[a]
restraint is reasonable only if it (1) is no greater than is required for the
protection of the employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on the
employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public. '290 Although the First
Restatement test was widely used,291 courts often reformulated the first
prong to require the protection of a "legitimate interest. '292
The Second Restatement of Contracts in 1981 provided that "[a] prom-
ise is unreasonable on grounds of public policy if it is unreasonably in
restraint of trade. '293 It further provided that "[a] promise is in restraint
of trade if its performance would limit competition in any business or
restrict the promisor in the exercise of a gainful occupation. ' 294 The
comments, however, noted that an ancillary restraint is not necessarily
invalid.295 Under two circumstances such a restraint would be invalid be-
cause it does not comply with the "rule of reason. '296 First, a restraint is
unreasonable when it "is greater than necessary to protect the legitimate
interests of the promisee. ''297 Second, even if no greater than necessary
to protect the employer's legitimate interests, the agreement is unreason-
able if the employer's "need for protection is outweighed by the hardship
to the promisor and the likely injury to the public." 298
Simply avoiding competition is not a legitimate interest. 299 Courts
have also declined to find a legitimate interest in protecting "general
knowledge, skill, or facility acquired through training or experience while
working for an employer .... -300 Rather, "[i]n order to enforce a re-
straint, the employee must present a substantial risk either to the em-
ployer's relationships with his customers or with respect to confidential
289. Id. § 516 cmt. h.
290. Blake, supra note 246, at 648-49; see also Carroll R. Wetzel, Employment Con-
tracts and Noncompetition Agreements, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 61, 61-62 ("Whether such an
incidental noncompetition agreement will be enforced depends upon its reasonableness as
determined by the needs of the person for whose benefit the restraint is imposed, the
extent of the hardship imposed upon the covenantor, and the degree to which the restraint
interferes with the interests of the public.").
291. Blake, supra note 246, at 648.
292. Id. at 649; see also John Dwight Ingram, Covenants Not to Compete, 36 AKRON L.
REV. 49, 50 (2002) (noting that courts require employer to have a "protectable interest" in
order to enforce non-compete agreement); Orsini, supra note 246, at 176 (noting that for a
restrictive covenant to be valid it must "protect a legitimate employer interest.").
293. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186(1) (1981).
294. Id. § 186(2).




299. Ingram, supra note 292, at 53.
300. Blake, supra note 246, at 652.
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business information. '30 1 With respect to customers,
the possibility is present that the customer will regard, or come to
regard, the attributes of the employee as more important in his busi-
ness dealings than any special qualities of the product or service of
the employer, especially if the product is not greatly differentiated
from others which are available. Thus, some customers may be per-
suaded, or even be very willing, to abandon the employer should the
employee move to a competing organization or leave to set up a bus-
iness of his own.30 2
E. CONCLUSION REGARDING EMPLOYEE COVENANTS
NOT TO COMPETE
In conclusion, employee covenants not to compete were originally con-
sidered invalid because they were contrary to the medieval Christian no-
tion that each person has a duty to serve God by working in the station to
which he was born and contrary to the apprenticeship system. In the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries, the ban on such restraints started to
be relaxed, and by the nineteenth century (when the apprenticeship sys-
tem was gone), courts were enforcing such restraints if they were "reason-
able. ''30 3 Having moved from status to contract, whether such a restraint
was reasonable had nothing to do with one's duty to God. But because
such agreements were considered in restraint of trade and therefore had
to be "reasonable" to be enforced, such agreements would never be wel-
comed fully into the realm of pure contract and its related idea of "free-
dom of contract." Thus, on the journey from status to contract the
employee covenant not to compete got left behind, and it now inhabits a
borderland between contracts that are automatically void as against pub-
lic policy and those that are enforceable as long as the traditional require-
ments for the formation of a contract are established.
Unfortunately, a doctrine that provides such agreements will be en-
forced if "reasonable" provides no guidance unless one knows what fac-
tors are considered in deciding whether the restraint is reasonable. As
discussed above, in addition to establishing that the covenant is enforcea-
ble under traditional contract doctrine (e.g., the rules regarding forma-
tion), four factors must be established: (1) the covenant must be
supported by a protectable business interest of the employer, which does
not include a simple desire to avoid competition; (2) the restriction must
be necessary to protect the business interest; (3) the restriction does not
impose an undue hardship on the employee; and (4) the restriction does
not harm the public.304 Most jurisdictions place the burden on the em-
ployer to prove that the restraint is reasonable. 30 5
301. Id. at 653.
302. Id. at 654.
303. See id. at 638-39.
304. See supra Part I1D.
305. See Kniffin, supra note 245, at 28 n.15 ("[T]oday the reasonableness of a noncom-
petition covenant must usually be shown by the party who seeks to enforce it, the cove-
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Perhaps the most interesting factor in the "reasonableness" test is the
requirement that it not place an undue hardship on the employee. Typi-
cally, contracts in restraint of trade are considered suspect because of the
harm to the public, but employee covenants not to compete are scruti-
nized with care because of a concern about unequal bargaining power
between employer and employee and the fact that the employee may not
fully appreciate the hardship to be suffered under the agreement.30 6 Ac-
cordingly, the special rules regarding the enforceability of such agree-
ments are based not only on concerns about harm to society from
reduced competition, but ideas about unequal bargaining power and a
paternalistic notion that employees will not fully appreciate the conse-
quences of their promises.
Thus, non-compete law and its "reasonable restraint" approach is a
synthesis of various theories of contract law. First, it is premised in part
on a desire to increase economic efficiency in that it generally enforces
agreements supported by a legitimate business interest and denies en-
forcement if the employer's goal is to simply prevent competition. Sec-
ond, it is based in part on the reliance theory of contracts in that it will
only enforce a non-compete agreement if the breach in fact harms the
employer. Third, it is based on substantive fairness in that a non-compete
agreement will not be enforced if it results in an undue burden upon the
employee. The will theory, the consent theory, and the bargained-for ex-
change theory play little role in current non-compete doctrine. But, as
will be discussed, the indeterminacy of non-compete law enables a trial
court judge to rely on the will theory, the consent theory, or the bar-
gained-for exchange theory when deciding such cases.
IV. WHY A TRIAL COURT JUDGE IS ABLE TO USE HIS OR
HER OWN THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW AS A FACTOR
WHEN DECIDING EMPLOYEE COVENANT
NOT TO COMPETE CASES
In addition to the factors discussed above that must be established to
render an employee covenant not to compete "reasonable" (and thus en-
forceable), this Article proposes that trial judges also take into considera-
tion their individual theories as to why contracts should be enforced. A
trial court judge is able to use his or her own theory of contract law as a
factor when deciding an employee covenant not to compete case because
of the tremendous discretion available to such judges in these cases. This
discretion stems from several bases. First, not only is a "reasonableness"
test inherently indeterminate, each of the four factors that must be estab-
nantee. A few cases, however, have placed the burden of proof on the covenantor.")
(citations omitted). Blake defends this position on the grounds that "[t]he employer, hav-
ing a fuller 'picture' of the company's interests and needs than any employee, should be in
a much better position to show that a restraint is no more burdensome than needed to
protect the employer's legitimate interest. The employee, on the other hand, would find it
difficult to show that the restraint is unreasonable." Blake, supra note 246, at 648 n.75.
306. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. g (1981).
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lished to render a restraint "reasonable" is itself indeterminate, providing
the trial court judge with substantial discretion. Second, there are a vari-
ety of standard contract doctrines relevant to such disputes that provide
the trial court judge with further discretion. Third, such cases usually be-
gin and end with a request for an injunction,30 7 and a trial court judge has
tremendous discretion when deciding whether to grant equitable relief.
To illustrate the tremendous discretion provided to a trial court judge in
these cases, each of these bases is discussed below in further detail.
A. THE INDETERMINACY OF EMPLOYEE COVENANT
NOT TO COMPETE LAW
Each of the four factors that must be established to render an em-
ployee covenant not to compete a "reasonable" restraint of trade is inde-
terminate.30 8 For example, determining whether there is a protectable
business interest essentially involves determining whether the employee
will have an "unfair advantage" when competing against the employer. 30 9
Although the categories of legitimate business interests are fairly well es-
tablished,310 the categories themselves are vague. For example, a protect-
able business interest includes confidential business information that the
employee could use to his or her advantage against the employer. 311 But
whether the information is confidential or is sufficiently known in the
industry is often a disputed issue. Also, whether the use of the informa-
tion would truly be harmful to the employer is generally disputed. Al-
though a substantial relationship with the employer's customers is
considered a legitimate business interest, determining whether a relation-
ship is "substantial" is usually disputed. Whether training is truly "spe-
cialized" and "unique" is likewise usually disputed.
Whether the particular restraint is necessary to protect the business in-
terest is also highly indeterminate. For example, whether a time frame
during which the employee is prohibited from competing is reasonable
cannot be determined with certainty, and it is likewise difficult at times to
determine whether the scope of the prohibition (both in terms of types of
work and geography) is reasonable.
Whether the restriction is too burdensome on the employee or the pub-
lic is likewise difficult to determine with certainty. Because the employee
will have taken a job competing against the employer, it is likely there
will be no evidence of the employee's ability to obtain work that is not in
violation of the covenant not to compete. Also, reasonable persons will
disagree as to whether it would be unduly burdensome for an employee
307. See Turner, supra note 5, at 43 ("Enforcement of a covenant not to compete usu-
ally begins with an application to the trial court for temporary injunctive relief ... .
308. See Blake, supra note 246, at 648-49.
309. Estlund, supra note 13, at 393.
310. See McDonald, supra note 9, at 143 (identifying the six types of protectable inter-





to take a job outside of her traditional area of work, and as to how far
such an employee should be expected to travel for a job that does not
violate the non-compete agreement.
With respect to whether the restriction is injurious to the public be-
cause the employee has been competing, there will likely be no such evi-
dence, permitting the trial judge to simply speculate as to the harm that
would occur if the employee is restrained. Reasonable persons will also
likely disagree in general whether non-compete agreements are harmful
to the public interest. Some will believe that the public benefits from
"freedom of contract." Others will believe that restricting employment
opportunities hurts competition and therefore is harmful to the public.
B. ADDITIONAL DOCTRINES BEYOND THE "REASONABLENESS"
REQUIREMENT THAT EXPAND THE TRIAL JUDGE'S
DISCRETION WHEN DECIDING AN EMPLOYEE
COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE CASE
In addition to the indeterminacy of employee covenant not to compete
law, there are a variety of other doctrines upon which a court's enforce-
ment of an employee covenant not to compete depends that have nothing
to do with whether the covenant is a "reasonable" restraint of trade.
Some of these include (1) interpreting the contract language; (2) deter-
mining whether the employer committed a material breach prior to the
employee's non-performance; and (3) determining whether the employer
has "clean hands." These doctrines provide further discretion to the trial
judge when deciding an employee covenant not to compete case, and
each of these bases is discussed below.
1. Interpretation
The "[i]nterpretation of a promise or agreement is the 'ascertainment
of its meaning."312 The process of interpreting a contract provides a trial
court with substantial discretion regarding whether to enforce an em-
ployee covenant not to compete. This is because various rules help keep
the interpretation of a contract within the province of the court, and away
from the jury. For example, courts in general treat the interpretation of a
contract as an issue of law to be decided by the court. 313 Also, under the
so-called "plain meaning rule" that is followed by most jurisdictions, 314
"if a writing, or a term is plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning
must be determined from the four corners of the instrument without re-
sort to extrinsic evidence of any kind. '315 Thus, the court has the power
to determine a contract's meaning without resort to the jury's fact finding
by concluding that the contract's meaning is plain and unambiguous on its
312. PERILLO, supra note 1, at 128 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 200 (1981)).
313. Id. at 141.
314. Id. at 130.
315. Id. at 129.
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face. Even when, however, extrinsic evidence is admitted to determine
the meaning of an ambiguous term, if "after taking the extrinsic evidence
into account, the meaning is so clear that reasonable jurors could reach
only one conclusion .... the question is treated as one of law." '316
2. Material Breach
The doctrine that a party's material breach relieves the other party of
having to perform his or her contract duties provides a trial judge with
further discretion when resolving employee non-compete cases. Al-
though English common law was slow to recognize the mutual depen-
dency of promises in a bilateral contract,317 in 1773 Lord Mansfield
announced that a constructive condition of a party's duty to perform was
the performance by the other party of its contract duties that were to be
performed first.318 Since that time, it has been established law that "it is a
condition of each party's remaining duties to render performances to be
exchanged under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured ma-
terial failure by the other party to render any such performance due at an
earlier time."' 319 A material non-performance suspends the other party's
remaining duties if the time for performance has not yet passed, and dis-
charges the other party's remaining duties if performance can no longer
occur.
3 2 0
Accordingly, if an employee covenant not to compete is included in an
employment contract that includes employer promises (such as particular
wages and bonuses, or a promise of job security), the employee can assert
that the employer materially breached one of these promises.321 If it is
found that there was such a material breach, the employee will be re-
lieved of his or her non-compete pledge.322 Although the existence of a
breach is generally an issue for the jury, as discussed below, this will be-
come an issue for the judge in most non-compete cases.
316. Id. at 141-42.
317. See Edwin W. Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COLUM. L. REV.
903, 907 (1942) (noting that there was a "delay in recognition of constructive conditions of
exchange" under English common law).
318. Kingston v. Preston, 2 Doug. 689 (K.B. 1773).
319. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1981).
320. Id. § 237 cmt. a.
321. See Turner, supra note 5, at 44 ("the trial court must consider the employee's alle-
gations that the employer committed a prior material breach of a dependent covenant in
the contract .... If the employer materially breached the contract between it and the
former employee prior to the employee's alleged breach of the non-compete agreement,
the employee's obligation to comply with the non-compete may be relieved."). "The em-
ployer's failure to pay compensation under a contract of employment is the most common
material breach available as a defense to employees who have previously signed non-com-
pete agreements." Id. at 45. One court has even permitted an allegation of sexual harass-
ment as an alleged breach by the employer of the employment contract. See Harrison v.
Palm Harbor MRI, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1117, 1119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
322. See Turner, supra note 5, at 44.
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3. Clean Hands Doctrine
The "clean hands doctrine" provides additional discretion to the trial
judge when deciding employee non-compete cases. 323 The doctrine gen-
erally provides "that a party cannot seek equitable relief ... if that party
has violated an equitable principle, such as good faith. ' 324 The applica-
tion of the "clean hands doctrine" has, however, also made its way into
actions at law.325 In fact, as recognized long ago by Zechariah Chafee,
Jr., "the clean hands maxim is not peculiar to equity, but is simply a pic-
turesque phrase applied by equity judges to a general principle running
through damage actions as well as suit for specific relief. '326 The "clean
hands doctrine" extends "to any inequitable, unconscionable, or bad faith
conduct that is connected to the case. ' 32 7 The theory is that courts "will
not interfere on behalf of a plaintiff whose own conduct in this connec-
tion had been contrary to conscience. '328
The vague parameters of the clean hands doctrine will provide the trial
judge with substantial discretion in an employee covenant not to compete
case. The very nature of such cases involves a former employment rela-
tionship between the parties, a relationship that was terminated. This will
often provide the employee with the opportunity to assert that the em-
ployer engaged in some sort of inequitable conduct that should preclude
enforcement of the non-compete pledge. For example, the employer
might have terminated the employee without good cause or the employee
might have quit as a result of employer wrongdoing, and this could be
asserted as a basis for denying relief.
4. Trial Courts' Discretion When Ruling on a Motion for an Injunction
A trial judge's discretion is further increased because the typical rem-
edy in cases enforcing a covenant not to compete is an injunction.329 An
injunction is the typical remedy requested for a variety of reasons. First,
it can be difficult for an employer to prove its damages to a reasonable
323. See id. at 46 ("A well-known principle of law that cannot be overlooked by the
attorney representing the employee in non-compete litigation is that '[o]ne who seeks the
aid of equity must do so with clean hands."').
324. BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 286 (9th ed. 2009).
325. See T. Leigh Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies: An Analysis of Unclean Hands,
99 Ky. L.J. 63, 65 (2010) ("[A]djudications in state and federal courts evidence the expan-
sion of unclean hands into matters of legal relief.").
326. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming Into Equity With Clean Hands, 47 MicH. L. REV.
1065, 1091-92 (1949). It has been noted that "[t]he work of former practitioner and
Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., is the main source of the American experi-
ence with the equitable defense." T. Leigh Anenson, Beyond Chafee: A Process-Based
Theory of Unclean Hands, 47 AM. Bus. L.J. 509, 519 (2010).
327. Anenson, supra note 325, at 64.
328. Chafee, Jr., supra note 326, at 877.
329. See John Sanchez, A Survey of Physician Non-Compete Agreements in Employ-
ment Under Florida Law, 35 NOVA L. REV. 63, 84 (2010) (noting that "an injunction is the
usual remedy for the breach of non-compete agreements").
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certainty.330 Second, most employers believe that the harm caused by the
breach will be irreversible if permitted to continue during the litigation
process. Thus, most employee non-compete cases begin with a motion
for a preliminary injunction, and they often end with the court's ruling on
the motion.331
The nature of an injunction provides the trial judge with substantial
discretion for three reasons. First, because an injunction is an equitable
remedy, the trial judge acts as the fact finder.332 Second, the trial judge
has substantial discretion in deciding whether to grant an injunction.333
Third, the elements of an injunction provide the trial judge with substan-
tial discretion. For example, a plaintiff seeking a temporary or prelimi-
nary injunction generally bears the burden of proving a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits.334 This burden includes establishing a
substantial likelihood of success both on the elements of the plaintiff's
330. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981) (providing that
"[djamages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be
established with reasonable certainty"); Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Carter, 9 So. 3d 1258, 1261
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) ("The usual remedy in cases involving a valid covenant not to
compete is injunctive relief since it is extremely difficult for a court to determine what
damages are caused by breach of the covenant.").
331. From my experience litigating these cases, the case typically ends with the trial
court's ruling on the motion for preliminary injunction for several reasons. First, because
such motions and the subsequent hearing are expensive, the parties are reluctant to expend
more money continuing to litigate. In particular, for an employee who has been prelimina-
rily enjoined, the employee has likely exhausted his or her resources defending against the
motion for an injunction and has now been deprived of a source of income. Second, the
trial court judge likely addressed the "substantial likelihood of success" element of a re-
quest for an injunction, and thus the parties will have a strong indication of which party
will ultimately prevail. Third, an employer who loses a motion for an injunction is unlikely
to be able to establish its damages to a reasonable certainty at trial and thus faces the
prospect of incurring additional expenses with no recovery. Fourth, the deference given to
a trial court's injunction decision generally renders an appeal to be not cost effective.
Fifth, the losing party might not have the emotional strength to continue litigating. Some
of these reasons have been recognized by a non-compete practitioner:
For the employee, defeating the employer's application for a temporary
restraining order is of the greatest importance. If this pivotal battle is lost,
the employee most likely will not have the emotional or financial resources
to prosecute a successful appeal of the nonfinal order granting the temporary
injunction. Months of being out of work in the employee's most economi-
cally productive occupation will take its toll. Lost contact with former clients
eventually results in the permanent loss of those customers.
While the advantages of defeating the application for temporary injunctive
relief are obvious in terms of the employee's short term financial status, a
victory also enhances the employee's long-term litigation position, as it puts
the employee in a much better bargaining position to work out a compromise
with the litigious employer.
Turner, supra note 5, at 43-44.
332. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed. Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 177 (2d Cir. 2000)
(noting that the court acts as the "preliminary factfinder in connection with the preliminary
injunction motion .... ").
333. See St. Charles Mfg. Co. v. St. Charles Furniture Corp., 482 F. Supp. 397,405 (N.D.
Ill. 1979) ("[T]he trial court has substantial discretion to grant a preliminary injunction
.... .).




claim as well as on each of the defendant's affirmative defenses.335 Ac-
cordingly, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving a substantial likeli-
hood of success on any defenses such as a material breach by the plaintiff
or the "clean hands doctrine. '336 Thus, the trial judge has the power to
find that a plaintiff has not carried its burden of proving a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits with respect to the defendant's affirm-
ative defenses.
V. TRIAL JUDGES, CONTRACT THEORY, AND EMPLOYEE
COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE CASES
How a trial judge will rule in an employee covenant not to compete
case is likely based, in part, on the judge's view as to why the legal system
enforces (or should enforce) contracts. This conclusion is reached for
several reasons. First, as discussed above, contracts scholars do not agree
on why contracts are (or should be) enforced, and have proposed numer-
ous conflicting theories. Second, if contracts scholars do not agree on
why contracts are (or should be) enforced, trial judges likely also disagree
on why contracts are (or should be) enforced. Third, as demonstrated
above, the controlling doctrine in an employee covenant not to compete
case (including non-compete law, contract defenses, and injunction law)
is highly indeterminate. This indeterminacy provides trial court judges
with the opportunity to reach decisions for reasons other than contract
doctrine, while clothing the opinion in the language of controlling doc-
trine. Fourth, practitioners and scholars alike agree that the outcome of
non-compete cases is very difficult to predict, and that courts reach con-
flicting decisions in cases with similar law and facts. Fifth, as noted by
Professor Joseph Perillo, "very many [appellate] cases have employed
flanking devices such as artful interpretation, the exercise of equitable
discretion, and even by stretching the equitable doctrine of unclean
hands[, in order to deny enforcement]. Other courts basically have sput-
tered that enforcement would be unjust. ' 3 37 If Professor Perillo is correct
that there are a substantial number of reported appellate court decisions
ignoring established doctrine, it is reasonable to conclude that there are
even more trial court decisions that intentionally fail to properly apply
established doctrine. This is particularly true because state trial court
judges rarely write opinions, 338 removing an incentive to properly apply
the law.
335. Erico Int'l Corp. v. Doc's Mktg., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-2924, 2007 WL 108450, at *7
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 2007), vacated on other grounds, 516 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
336. Id.
337. Perillo, supra note 14, at 88-89.
338. See MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS:
THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 44 (1999) (noting that state trial court opin-
ions are rarely written). If an injunction is granted, however, an opinion must generally be
provided with findings of fact and conclusions of law. Joseph S. Berman, et al., Preliminary
Injunctions and Temporary Restraining Orders, 1 FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FIRST
CIRCUIT n. 21 (2011).
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All of these factors point to the conclusion that a factor in deciding
employee covenant not to compete cases is the judge's belief as to why
the legal system should enforce contracts. 339 This, in turn, suggests that
practitioners should recognize that arguing contract doctrine might be
necessary, but not sufficient, when handling an employee non-compete
case, and that the work of contract theory scholars should be incorpo-
rated into any arguments (although not explicitly). 340 This section, there-
fore, addresses how judges who adopt each of the previously discussed
theories of contract law would likely approach an employee covenant not
to compete case.
A. JUDGE FOLLOWING THE RELIANCE AND RESTITUTION THEORY
For a judge who believes that contract law is principally based on pro-
tecting the promisee's reliance interest and restitution interest, 341 the
judge's primary focus will be on whether (and to what extent) the em-
ployer relied on the employee's non-compete promise. If the trial judge
believes that the employer would not have hired the employee had the
employee not signed the non-compete agreement, this might work in
favor of the employer. Importantly, though, such a judge will not likely
view the simple hiring of the employee as significant employer reliance.
The trial judge will view the non-competition agreement as collateral to
339. Thus, even if Professor Farnsworth was correct when he suggested that "future
scholars looking for potential topics might look elsewhere [than contract theory]," Farns-
worth, supra note 18, at 209, contract theory likely plays an important role in explaining
the unpredictable nature of non-compete cases.
340. The use by trial judges of different contract theories when deciding employee cov-
enant not to compete cases is particularly harmful at both the contracting and the enforce-
ment stage. For those employers who are in fact seeking to protect a legitimate business
interest, it will create a disincentive to provide employees with valuable information. It
will also cause such employers to pay employees less money than they otherwise would.
The employer will discount the employee's wages based on the chance that the employee
will be permitted to engage in unfair competition after the termination of employment.
For those employers who are simply seeking to prevent competition, it will encourage such
employers to use non-competition agreements because even if the contract is unenforce-
able under established legal doctrine, the contract might still be enforced by a particular
trial judge. For employees, the unpredictable nature of such cases might lead to the idea
that such agreements are generally not enforceable, thereby causing employees to under-
value their promises. At the enforcement stage, the unpredictability makes it very hard to
settle such cases. As an initial matter, such cases are generally very difficult to settle be-
cause employers fear that a failure to enforce such an agreement will result in other em-
ployees breaching the terms of their non-compete agreements. Thus, even when a non-
compete agreement does not appear reasonable, an employer has an incentive to proceed
because the chance of success is greater than it would be based solely on an application of
legal doctrine. For an employee facing the loss of a livelihood, the employee confronted
with a reasonable non-compete agreement might as well defend to see if the result will be
contrary to established doctrine. There is, unfortunately, no easy solution to this problem.
Unless the doctrine governing employee non-compete agreements is made more determi-
nate, trial judges will continue to have tremendous discretion in these cases. This, in turn,
will permit such judges to use their theory of contract law as a factor when deciding these
cases. But, to the extent this factor is recognized as a part of the trial judge's decision-
making process, attorneys in such cases can at least fashion their arguments with such an
understanding.
341. See supra Part II.C.1.
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the employee's promise to work for the employee and the employer's
return promise to pay compensation, even if the non-competition agree-
ment provides that part of the consideration for the employee's non-com-
pete promise is being hired and paid wages. Thus, inasmuch as the
employer received the employee's labor, the trial judge will not likely
view the employer's reliance as significant if the only argument is that the
employer would not have hired the employee.
The insubstantial nature of the reliance interest in such a situation is
demonstrated by determining the remedy if the employer sued an em-
ployee for breach of a non-competition agreement and sought damages
to protect its reliance interest. 342 The so-called "reliance interest" is the
promisee's "interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on
the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract not been made. '343 When the only alleged employer
reliance is hiring the employee, the employer would be faced with the
difficult task of demonstrating that it would have been in a better position
had it never hired the employee. And if the only harm asserted is the
mere hiring of the employee, the employer will have to convince the trial
judge that had it not hired this particular employee, it would have hired
another employee who either would have worked for less compensation,
or who would have been more productive. This will likely be too specula-
tive to carry much weight with a trial judge who believes contracts should
be enforced to protect the reliance and restitution interest.
Although such a judge also believes that contracts should be enforced
to protect the promisee's restitution interest, such a judge likewise will
not consider the restitution interest as particularly strong if the only al-
leged benefit conferred was the payment of wages. As previously dis-
cussed, because the non-compete agreement will likely be viewed as
collateral to the employee's promise to work and the employer's promise
to pay wages, it will be difficult for the employer to establish that the
employee (who performed the work) has been unjustly enriched.
Accordingly, even though non-compete contracts rarely remain execu-
tory (like contracts in general, according to Atiyah), and would likely
never be enforced if they were (because of the lack of a legitimate busi-
ness interest supporting enforcement), the trial judge who believes con-
tracts should be enforced to protect the promisee's reliance interest or
restitution interest will require reliance that is more directly tied to the
employee's non-compete promise. An exception, however, will likely be
when the employer has paid the employee a substantial salary based in
reliance on the employee's non-compete promise. In such a case, the sal-
ary (and thus the reliance) is tied directly to the employee's non-compete
342. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (1981) ("As an alternative to
[damages based on the expectation interest], the injured party has a right to damages based
on his reliance interest, including expenditures made in preparation for performance or in
performance, less any loss that the party in breach can prove with reasonable certainty the
injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed.").
343. Id. § 344.
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promise. There would likely be a substantial enough reliance interest and
restitution interest to warrant enforcement in a case like this (according
to such a judge).
Thus, rather than focusing on the employer's reliance in hiring and pay-
ing the employee, such a trial judge will focus on the strength of the em-
ployer's legitimate business interest justifying enforcement, and will also
focus on the irreparable harm requirement in an injunction proceeding.
The judge will look for the employer to have given something to the em-
ployee (tangible or intangible) in reliance on the employee's non-com-
pete promise, such as specialized training, access to customers, or access
to confidential business information. Note that each of these alleged le-
gitimate business interests includes both reliance as well as restitution. In
each case, the employer has provided something to the employee that the
employee can now use in competition against the employer. Such a judge
will carefully scrutinize the alleged legitimate business interest to ensure
that it truly is something the employer would not have given the em-
ployee had the employee not made the non-compete promise (the reli-
ance aspect), and whether the information truly can be used by the
employee to her benefit (the restitution aspect). Such a judge will also
carefully scrutinize whether the employee is, in fact, threatening to use
that information to the direct harm of the former employer.
These judges will not be particularly concerned about failing to enforce
a promise, inasmuch as they will view enforcement of a contract as prima-
rily based on avoiding harm or preventing unjust enrichment, and not
based primarily on the voluntary assumption of a duty by the promisor.
Whether these judges will be more or less likely than other judges to ex-
cuse non-performance will depend on whether their reliance theory in-
cludes the belief that contract law and tort law have similar purposes (and
perhaps should be assimilated). For those judges who follow this strain of
reliance theory, they will be more willing than other judges to excuse the
employee's nonperformance of the non-competition pledge on the
grounds that the nonperformance was "reasonable." These judges, there-
fore, will likely give careful consideration to why the employment rela-
tionship ended. If the employer terminated the relationship without just
cause (even if the employment relationship was on an "at will" basis), or
the employee quit with good cause, the trial judge might consider this as a
factor favoring non-enforcement (because the employee has not acted
unreasonably). These judges will also likely consider whether the em-
ployee signed a lengthy form contract and thus might not have been suffi-
ciently aware of the non-compete provision, or whether the employee
lacked the bargaining power to object. In such situations the judge might
view the employee's non-performance as reasonable. But for those
judges who follow a reliance theory and believe there should still be a
strict division between contract law and tort law, they will enforce the




In general, judges who follow the reliance and restitution theory will
issue rulings beneficial to employees and detrimental to employers.
These judges will require the employer to demonstrate substantial harm
caused by the employee's alleged breach, or unjust enrichment of the em-
ployee. Also, if such a judge believes contract law and tort law serve the
same purpose, such a judge might be more willing to excuse an em-
ployee's non-performance on the grounds that the employee has acted
reasonably.
B. JUDGE FOLLOWING THE WILL THEORY
For those judges who believe contractual liability is (or should be)
based on the moral obligation to keep one's voluntarily assumed obliga-
tion,344 the judge's primary focus will be on whether the employee under-
stood that she was promising not to compete against the employer. Thus,
although presumably paying homage to the objective theory of contracts,
such a judge will, in fact, apply a subjective theory of contracts and seek
out a "meeting of the minds" between the parties. For this judge, the
factors commonly associated with procedural unconscionability (which
focuses on whether a "voluntary meeting of the minds was possible"), 345
including "unfair surprise" and the "absence of meaningful choice,"
346
will be important. Thus, such a judge is likely to deny enforcement if the
employee is unsophisticated or if the promise was buried in a lengthy and
complicated form contract of employment. 347
344. See supra Part II.C.2. (discussing the will theory of contract).
345. Collins v. Click Camera & Video, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1294, 1299 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993).
346. The doctrine of unconscionability is generally divided into so-called "procedural
unconscionability" and "substantive unconscionability," both of which must usually exist
for a contract to be unenforceable under the unconscionability doctrine. Id. at 1299. "Pro-
cedural unconscionability" refers to defects in the bargaining process, as opposed to unfair-
ness in the contract's terms ("substantive unconscionability"). Id. Procedural
unconscionability itself can be divided into two categories: (1) unfair surprise, see UCC § 2-
302 cmt. 1 (1977) (noting that "[t]he principle is one of the prevention of... unfair sur-
prise"); and (2) absence of meaningful choice. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981) (referring to "no meaningful choice" or "no real alternative.");
see also Barnett, supra note 168, at 632 (noting that "[uinconscionability is associated with
the problems of unequal bargaining power, unfair surprise, and substantively unreasonable
terms"). These two sub-categories of procedural unconscionability are distinct because a
party might lack a meaningful choice while at the same time being fully aware of the con-
tract's terms. Conversely, a party might be unfairly surprised to discover (after entering
into the contract) a particular term in a contract, despite having had a meaningful choice as
to whether to enter into the contract. It is important to recognize that the procedural
unconscionability analysis is not (and could not be, under the objective theory of contract
formation) the same as the will theory of contracts. Procedural unconscionability seeks to
determine whether a so-called "meeting of the minds was possible," not whether a "meet-
ing of the minds" in fact occurred. Collins, 621 N.E.2d at 1299.
347. The hostility the will theory should have for form contracts was explained by Pro-
fessor Barnett as follows:
[I]f a subjective view of contractual assent is taken, then form contracts pose
a very serious problem. If a person must consciously have had the particular
terms in mind when signifying agreement to them, then most terms in most
form contracts lack assent. Most people fail to read most terms most of the
time and no person can credibly claim to read all of the terms in form con-
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But, if this judge concludes that the employee understood what she was
promising, the strength of the legitimate business interest is not likely to
be carefully scrutinized. This judge will view contract law and tort law as
having strict doctrinal separation. Thus, upon concluding that the em-
ployee understood the non-compete pledge, this judge will not be particu-
larly willing to excuse non-performance of the non-compete agreement
based on an absence of harm to the employer or an argument that non-
performance was "reasonable." The judge will also not be particularly
receptive to arguments that the non-compete promise is unenforceable
based on a lack of consideration (because will theorists believe that the
consideration requirement is misguided and inconsistent with the moral
obligation to keep a promise).
For this judge, as long as the employee understood what she was prom-
ising and had a meaningful choice to not enter into the agreement, the
immoral party is not the employer but the employee who promised not to
compete and then reneged. The employee invoked the convention of
promising and invited the employer's trust, and then used the employer
by breaking her promise and abusing the employer's trust.
In general, these judges' rulings will benefit employers and be detri-
mental to those with little bargaining power. Many non-competition
agreements will be stand-alone agreements that the employee will read,
or they will be included in employment agreements that are not as
lengthy as many form contracts. Also, most employees will have a choice
in that they can seek employment elsewhere. Accordingly, these judges
will generally view the non-compete agreement to be enforceable based
on the moral obligation to keep a promise.
C. JUDGE FOLLOWING THE CONSENT THEORY
For a judge following the consent theory, 348 as long as the judge con-
cludes that the employee manifested consent to the non-compete agree-
ment, the judge will be inclined to enforce the agreement. Whether the
employee read or understood the non-compete provision will not be par-
ticularly important to this judge (for example, consent theorists generally
believe form contracts should be enforced because the party manifested
consent). 349 Also, the judge will not be particularly receptive to argu-
ments regarding a lack of consideration because, like will theorists, con-
tracts all of the time. Every contracts professor and law student knows this
from personal experience. Everyone reading these words, including yours
truly, has at one time clicked the "I agree" box of a software license agree-
ment without reading the terms in the scroll-down box. Hence the problem:
How can someone be said to have "actually"-meaning subjectively-con-
sented to terms of which one was completely unaware? To impute subjective
assent to the person indicating consent to a form is obviously to engage in a
fiction. Under a subjective theory of contractual assent, very few, if any, of
the terms in a form contract would be assented to.
Barnett, supra note 168, at 628-29.
348. See supra Part II.C.3. (discussing the consent theory of contract).
349. See Barnett, supra note 168.
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sent theorists maintain that the consideration doctrine is misguided. Such
a judge will also not scrutinize the employer's alleged legitimate business
interest as much as other judges because it is the employee's manifesta-
tion of consent to the agreement, not the harm caused by the employee's
breach, that is the key issue.
Of course, the consent theory is based on the idea that a party has
consented to transfer the promisor's entitlement. This requires that the
judge conclude there was an entitlement that was capable of being trans-
ferred. Thus, it is possible that such a judge will believe that a promise to
refrain from competing is not an entitlement that should be transferable.
But in general, these judges will issue rulings favorable to employers be-
cause the employee will have manifested an intent to be legally bound to
the agreement by signing it.
D. JUDGE FOLLOWING THE BARGAIN THEORY
For those judges who believe contractual liability is (or should be)
based on the "bargain theory," 350 the judge's primary focus will be the
process of entering into the contract. If, as argued by Grant Gilmore, this
theory makes it difficult to enter into a contract, these judges will care-
fully scrutinize the agreement to ensure there existed consideration for
the employee's non-compete promise. These judges will likely look for
consideration beyond mere employment at will. But once this judge de-
termines that there was a bargained-for exchange with respect to the em-
ployee's non-compete promise, such a judge will not scrutinize the
amount of consideration. 351 Also, upon determining that there was a bar-
gain, the objective theory of contracts will apply and liability will be
strict.352 Thus, these judges will likely apply standard contract doctrine
with respect to formation, but once a contract is found will likely not
carefully scrutinize the alleged legitimate business interest. They will also
be resistant to arguments that an employee's non-performance should be
excused based upon the various defenses previously discussed (interpre-
tation, employer material breach, or clean hands doctrine), or because
non-performance was "reasonable." In general, these judges' decisions
will generally favor the employer, once the employer is able to establish
consideration.
350. See supra Part I.C.4. (discussing the bargain theory of contract).
351. Under the bargained-for exchange theory for enforcing promises, the amount of
consideration provided in return for the promise is irrelevant to determine whether there
was, in fact, consideration provided. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79(b)
(1981) (providing that "[i]f the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional
requirement of ... equivalence in the values exchanged"); id. cmt. c ("Ordinarily... courts
do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration.... [T]he requirement of consideration
is not a safeguard against imprudent and improvident contracts except in cases where it
appears that there is no bargain in fact.").
352. See supra Part II.C.4. (discussing the bargain theory of contract).
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E. JUDGE FOLLOWING THE EFFICIENCY THEORY
For those judges who believe that contractual liability is (or should be)
based on promoting economic efficiency, 353 the issue will be whether
non-compete agreements in general, or perhaps the particular non-com-
pete agreement at issue, increase society's welfare. How such a judge will
respond to a non-compete case is difficult to predict because law and eco-
nomics scholars themselves have different approaches to when such
agreements should be enforced. 354
In general, a judge seeking to increase economic efficiency will be a
strong believer in "freedom of contract, '355 based on the notion that any
contract entered into knowingly and voluntarily will move resources to
their most valued uses, thereby increasing society's welfare. 356 But such a
judge might also be interested in circumstances that might undermine the
mutual or societal gain assumption, such as bargaining process defects or
negative externalities. 357
Usually, for these judges, whether there was a "market failure," or in
other words, a defect in the bargaining process, might be important. For
example, these judges might focus on whether there was an asymmetry of
information between the parties or a lack of meaningful choice. 358 An
asymmetry of information that might exist is the enforceability of non-
compete agreements in general. For example, an employee might incor-
rectly believe that non-compete agreements are unenforceable, and
therefore not give appropriate consideration to the provision. An em-
ployee might also lack a meaningful choice because it might be customary
for all of the employers in the particular industry to require a non-com-
pete agreement as a condition of employment.
These judges might also police the bargain to make sure that the em-
ployee did in fact receive fair value for her non-compete promise. Thus,
if the employee is terminated shortly after starting work, the trial judge
might not view the exchange as being mutually beneficial. Although such
an analysis is contrary to the general view that the adequacy of the ex-
change is not assessed-and would also reduce the ability of parties to
rely on contracts-if it was the employer who terminated the employee
353. See supra Part II.C.5. (discussing efficiency theory as basis for enforcing contracts).
354. See Andrew J. Gallo, Comment, A Uniform Rule for Enforcement of Non-Compe-
tition Contracts in Relation to "Termination Cases," 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 719, 722-24
(1998) (discussing different views of law and economics scholars with respect to employee
covenants not to compete).
355. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity's Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the
Twentieth Century's Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265,
308 (1999) ("[F]reedom of contract principles have been closely aligned with law and eco-
nomics theorists.").
356. See supra Part II.C.5.
357. See Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81
VA. L. REV. 2305, 2309 (1995) (stating that concerns of the law and economics tradition
with respect to the mutual gain assumption and full contractual enforcement includes de-
fects in the bargaining process and effects on third parties).
358. Mark A. Glick, et al., The Law and Economics of Post-Employment Covenants: A
Unified Framework, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357, 391 n.205 (2002).
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(perhaps without good cause), the employer's own conduct would be the
cause of the employee's promise being unenforceable. Such an ex post
facto approach to efficiency, however, is generally rejected by law and
economics scholars.
Because employee covenants not to compete have a negative external-
ity in that they prevent a prospective employer from hiring the employee,
as well as reduce competition, these judges might also focus on the
strength of the employer's alleged legitimate business interest supporting
the non-compete agreement. 359 For example, law and economics scholars
often favor the enforceability of employee non-compete agreements on
the grounds that such agreements encourage employers to provide em-
ployees with training and access to customers and confidential informa-
tion, all of which helps the employee be more productive. 360 If, however,
there is no such legitimate business interest, and the employer is simply
attempting to prevent competition, such a judge is likely to consider the
agreement as decreasing societal welfare.
Of course, such a judge might believe that it is too difficult and time-
consuming to decide the efficiency of every non-compete agreement that
is the subject of a lawsuit. Such a judge would enforce or not enforce
such agreements based upon a decision whether such agreements in-
crease economic efficiency in general. The judge might also believe that
the indeterminacy of such an individualized approach would be harmful
to employers and employees alike, who would be unable to predict
whether their agreements are enforceable.
In general, because this type of judge will start with the premise that
"freedom of contract" is beneficial to society, this judge will generally
reach results that are favorable for employers and detrimental for em-
ployees. If, however, it can be shown that there was some bargaining
process defect, or that the employer is simply trying to prevent competi-
tion (as opposed to having a legitimate business interest supporting the
non-compete agreement), this judge is likely to refuse enforcement.
F. JUDGE FOLLOWING THE SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS THEORY
For judges who follow a substantive fairness theory, 361 the judge will
carefully scrutinize the agreement to determine whether, in the judge's
opinion, it is "fair." It is important, however, to keep in mind the distinc-
tion between fairness at the time the parties entered into the contract,
and ex post facto fairness. The substantive fairness theory underlying the
unconscionability doctrine is based on the fairness at the time of con-
359. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Interpreting Torts, Explaining Contracts, 15 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 747, 769 n.68 (1992) ("A contract term may advance the parties' interests but
be inefficient because it imposes costs on third parties that exceed the contracting parties'
gains.").
360. Rubin & Shedd, supra note 250, at 93.
361. See supra Part II.C.6. (discussing the substantive fairness theory).
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tracting.362 But the substantive fairness theory used by judges in em-
ployee covenant not to compete cases will likely also involve a post hoc
assessment of the agreement.
With respect to the substantive fairness at the time of contracting, such
a judge will likely look at whether the employer has provided additional
consideration for the non-compete promise, beyond the wages expected
for an employee who had not signed such a non-compete agreement. Not
only will such a judge seek additional consideration for the non-compete
pledge, the judge will place great weight on whether the amount of con-
sideration is fair. These judges will also carefully scrutinize the geo-
graphic and temporal scope of the restraint, as well as the breadth of the
types of work prohibited.
With respect to the substantive fairness after the breach, the judge will
carefully consider the effect enforcement would have, as well as the effect
non-enforcement would have. Such a judge will look closely at the em-
ployer's legitimate business interest allegedly supporting enforcement.
The judge will also pay particular attention to the burden imposed upon
the employee. If the employee is unlikely to find employment without
breaching the agreement, the judge will be inclined to deny enforcement.
These judges will also consider why the employment relationship ended.
If the employer terminated the employment without just cause (even if
the employee was employed on an at will basis), or the employee quit
with good cause (particularly if the good cause is attributable to employer
conduct), the judge is likely to consider enforcement to be unfair. Also, if
the employment relationship was short, the court is likely to consider that
the consideration provided for the non-compete promise was not
sufficient.
In general, because of the harsh effect such agreements can have on
employees, these judges will usually render rulings favorable to low-level
employees. With respect to high-level executives, these judges will likely
render rulings favorable to employers, based on the notion that these em-
ployees were well-compensated for their promises and received access to
confidential information.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the value of contract theory to the legal profession has been
questioned, one area in which it offers substantial benefits is identifying
what factors (other than contract doctrine) an individual judge considers
important in a contract dispute. When legal doctrine is indeterminate,
and the judge has substantial discretion in deciding a contract dispute,
362. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 208 (1981) ("If a contract or term
thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or
may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable
result.") (emphasis added).
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such considerations might play an important part in the judge's decision.
An employee non-compete case is likely such an area.
How a trial court will respond to such a case is notoriously unpredict-
able. Although this unpredictability is caused by several factors, one of
its causes is the indeterminacy of legal doctrine in this area. This, in turn,
permits trial judges to rely on their own theory as to why contracts are (or
should be) enforced. Accordingly, when litigating such a case, relying
upon legal doctrine, while necessary, is not sufficient. Rather, counsel
should incorporate arguments designed to appeal to as many of the com-
peting contract theories as possible.
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